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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been much research conducted in an attempt to identify and explain why
ethnic-secessionist movements start, how they can divide countries, how transnational ethnic ties
impact the relationship between states and diaspora, and why states and ethnic groups support
violent groups. Most studies primarily focus on the homeland state and diaspora relationship
(Wayland 2004, Sheffer 1986, King and Melvin 1999-2000, Sorrentino 2003). They examine
how homeland policies influence the host state and what role the homeland plays for diaspora. In
this paper, I am interested in co-ethnic groups that do not have a homeland or a state to protect
their economic or political interest. How do these ethnic groups react or respond when a member
of the same ethnic group has an armed conflict in a neighboring country?1 Moreover, under
which circumstances do they reject or support co-ethnic violent groups?
In general, I am examining the reasons and conditions for why ethnic groups do or do not
support violent ethnic groups. There are many possible explanations for my question. However,
it is obvious that ethnic ties play a key role for co-ethnic groups’ respective support of the violent
group. Existing literature suggests that external threat or interstate rivalries influence states’
decisions to support violent groups. It has been argued that states believe that the benefit of
supporting a violent group is higher than the cost. The primary argument for co-ethnic groups
claims that ethnic ties or a sense of common identity forms the key motivation for the groups’
support of one another. Existing studies neither acknowledge nor consider the presence of either
direct military or economical threat, or both, to a country. This is crucial as such threats often
lead to a state’s withdrawal and relinquishment of its support in light of the possible great loss
1

My definition of “armed conflict” drawn from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which defines “an armed conflict as a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory over which the use of armed force between the military forces of two parties, of which
at least one is the government of a state, has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths each year.”

2
incurred should the state involve itself in a direct confrontation. Therefore, I believe ethnic
groups’ perceptions of threat hold import and thus necessitate clarification as to how a threat
convinces a group to support or reject support for violent co-ethnic groups.
I examine the causal relationship between external threat and non-support through a
structured comparative study of Kurdish ethnic groups, which include the Kurdistan Workers
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) from Turkey, the Kurdish Autonomous region in
Iraq, Kurds from Syria, and KDPI, Komala and PJAK from Iran. The time period I primarily
focus on is the mid 1980’s, when the PKK , the PUK, the KDP, KDPI, and Komala were already
established and militarily active; and after 1999, when PJAK was established and Syria shut
down the PKK camps and established their camps in Northern Iraq (Hooper 2007). I explore why
some Kurdish groups have established cooperation (PKK, PJAK and Syrian Kurds) but why the
Kurdish Autonomous region (the PUK and the KDP) in Iraq failed to cooperate with the PKK
and PJAK. Moreover, I determine whether external pressures or threat had any influence on
their cooperation or non-cooperation.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Rational Choice Theory and Group Favoritism
Some authors explain cooperation and non-cooperation within groups through the lens of
rational choice theory. As it is understood, rational choice theory seeks to explain normal human
behavior, for which there is a certain level of rationality when engaging in a specific behavior.
Rational choice theory states that “individuals have given goals, wants, tastes or utilities”
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(Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982, 415). As we know, it is impossible to achieve or
recognize all goals, due to scarcity. Therefore individuals will decide between alternative choices
to maximize their self-interest. These give us two different paths. One is to set a course of action
that diminishes the small separate possible actions. The second involves the actors deciding on
which path to take for action. As a result, people choose the one that will manifest the most
desired goal. People decide to join in a collective action based on whether the utility benefits of
their participation exceed the costs. These actors see cooperation or participation as a net benefit.
The more a group achieves from collective action, the greater the strength of possible collective
action that will follow (Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 1982). By conducting a lengthy cost
and benefit analysis of the situation, rational choice theory examines whether or not groups or
individuals act rationally. This approach identifies a causal mechanism, which – even when
applied to relatively obvious cases – can still reveal novel findings. It also demonstrates the
results of interaction between actors and groups and between both actors and groups together
(aggregation), along with the logic behind their decision to not cooperate. Groups make
decisions or choose their strategies based on the cost and benefits analysis. Individuals and
groups try to pursue a goal or goals that best fulfill(s) their objective and while they are
accomplishing their ideal goal they aim for utility maximization (Geddes 2010). However, some
studies cast doubt on the rational choice theory argument. Group favoritism might explain why a
certain group would tend to support their members even though the cost exceeds the benefit.
Axelrod and Hammond (2003) emphasized the importance of ethnocentrism in
cooperation. This behavior involves cooperation between group members, however not with
those outside of the group. Therefore, “ethnocentrism can be in-group favoritism or out-group
hostility” (3). This attitude creates noncooperation with other groups or members. One reason for
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the development of ethnocentrism is competition between groups or individuals. Groups and
members tend to interact very often with members of their group, resulting in more strained
interaction with other groups. The idea is that when people see themselves as members of a
group they are more likely to contribute, even if the cost exceeds the benefit. Group members
tend to favor in-groups even if their self-interest does not apply (Axelrod and Hammond 2003).
Even though individuals may not gain much from the action, they can still gain in the long term,
which suggests that members’ decisions to favor the in-group are still rational. For example,
Manzano and Sanchez evaluate co-ethnic preferences toward co-ethnic candidates. They find
that Latinos with strong ethnic attachments remain inclined to prefer a co-ethnic group even
when less qualified than a non-Latino candidate. Latinos with higher levels of Latino group
identification are also most likely to support a Latino candidate. Latino preferences for co-ethnic
candidates vary even though their decision upon an individual is most influenced by their level
of ethnic identification and the type of Latino candidate choice at hand (Soto and Maria 2007).
Group favoritism and out of group hostility increase in a competitive situation and in the
presence of an external threat (Axelrod and Hammond 2003). Manzano and Sanchez’s (2010)
study demonstrates that ethnic identities are important for individual preferences and co-ethnic
support. It also illustrates that competitive situations between groups increase group favoritism,
even though it is in neither the members’ nor the individuals’ best interest to vote for a Latino
candidate. However, Manzano and Sanchez’s study still does not explain how ethnic ties impact
separatist movements nor explains how these ethnic ties impact transnational ethnic networks.
Rational choice theory gives us some understanding of group cooperation and how individuals
makes their choices. However, to have a better understanding why an ethnic group seeks a
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separatist or secessionist movement may help us to understand why ethnic group cooperation is
essential for such movements.
2.2 Ethnic Secessionist/Separatist Movements
Horowitz (1981) defines separatism as an idea that demands “‘political self-expression’ usually on a territorial basis – and is ‘a necessary concomitant of group distinctiveness’” (166).
Tir (2005) declares that secession is an effort to settle an internal territorial dispute through the
division of a country into new, secessionist (Southern Sudan), and rump (Northern Sudan) states.
This means separatist or secessionist movements usually demand for the creation of a separate
state or regional autonomy within the existing state. Separatist movements generally seek to
achieve statehood by way of armed conflict. Ethnic secessionist movements are neither recent
nor purely ethnic phenomena. Sweden and Norway split up their union in 1905 and China and
Taiwan divided for ideological, as well as economic reasons (Tir, 2005).
International politics, via the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state,
largely determine if a secessionist movement will accomplish its goal (Horowitz (1981, 167).
The international community also holds the power of recognition, which can be utilized for
leverage against the state (by threatening to give recognition) and against the separatists (by
refusing to give recognition). If the international community forces the government to solve the
problems peacefully, the separatists may possibly drop the demands (Tir 2005). Nevertheless,
this does not guarantee peaceful resolution. Moreover, territorial disputes after separation can
also be problematic.
Tir also examines peaceful and violent secessionist movements. Some disputes are not
solved peacefully, in which case leaders of the rump states attempt to retake the lost land,
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whereas secessionist states try to acquire more land from rump states or another secessionist
state, as seen in the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. Therefore peaceful versus
violent secession can also affect a movement’s future desire. Most ethnically-based secessions
tend to play an important part in a conflict’s onset (Tir 2005). Sometimes a secessionist state still
does not create ethnically homogeneous states. The treatment of minority groups creates tension
between the states and each state tries to protect their “ethnic brethren who have been ‘left’ in the
other state (719). This creates a complicated relationship between “the states in which they live
(host states), and the actions of governments that might make some historical or cultural claim to
represent them (kin states)” (King and Melvin 1999-2000, 108). Nevertheless, separatist ideas
can be a great threat to some countries. For instance, most African states face severe “racial,
religious, tribal, and linguistic divisions” (Saideman 1997, 723). States fear that should some
group successfully question artificial African boundaries then all the boundaries will be
challenged, thus undermining the entire system (Saideman 1997 and Herbst 1986). Therefore "…
all parties know that once African boundaries begin to change there would be an indefinite
period of chaos... the grave danger of not cooperating is clear to all" (Herbst 1989, 690).
Woodward (1995) argues that western countries wanted to protect Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity because they thought such an action would create an example for the Soviet Union.
However, mutual vulnerability still fails to explain how leaders deal with critical situations
because not all states follow the same solutions to common problems. Vulnerability can be
perceived differently with diverse interests (Miller 1995 and Morgan and Bickers 1992).
Saideman (1997) argues that politicians make decisions depending upon constituents’
ethnic ties. If politicians’ constituents possess ethnic ties to secessionist groups then states tend
to support the secessionist groups. If they have ties with host states then the states side
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accordingly. This suggests that cooperation must promote political benefits, otherwise,
cooperation is unlikely. Most African countries cooperated during the Congo Crisis and Nigerian
Civil War due to their domestic political motivations (Saideman 1997). Nevertheless,
Saideman’s study fails to provide much information in regards to the relationship between kin
and host states; therefore, an examination of the ethnic-nationalist network will provide us with
knowledge of ethnic group cooperation.
2.3 Ethno-Nationalist Networks
According to Wayland (2004), the relationship between host and kin states is called an
ethno-nationalist networks. The term ‘transnationalism’ first appeared in the 1970s. It brought
forth and emphasized “the role of non-state actors”. The term mostly correlates with economic
affairs such as the role of international organizations and companies in international affairs
(Wayland 2004, 407). Increases in transnational non-governmental organizations (NGO) draw
scholar’s attention to examine these organizations and their activities. Wayland refers to
transnationalism as “identities and intra-ethnic relations that transcend state borders” (p. 48).
Transnational ethnic networks are established between co-ethnic groups and among several
states as well as between diaspora communities and co-ethnics in the homeland (Wayland 2004).
Diasporas are ethnic groups of migrant origins living in host countries that still have strong ties
and economic links to their countries of origin, also known as their homeland (Sheffer 1986).
These networks may interact directly with homeland politics and also lobby their “host” states to
change their policies toward the homeland. Basically, transnational ethnic networks help and
broaden support for their homeland. In the case of Tamil diaspora living abroad, they have
established political offices overseas and have financially supported the Tamil insurgencies to
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maintain an independent homeland (Wayland 2004). However, not all ethnic groups aim for an
independent state.
Sorrentino’s (2003) definition gives us a better understanding. He defines ethnic
nationalism as “…a group with members that may or may not exist within the boundaries of a
single state, yet whose members can be categorized as a group of individuals that share a
common ethnic nationalist identity” (10). These groups may share an interest in the welfare of
their transnational community as a whole; however, this does not mean that the existence of a
sovereign homeland is the primary interest of all members of the community. The ethnic ties are
also influenced by state identity as well as a diffuse ethnic population which plays an important
role in interstate relations. If the connection and relationship is strong between kin state and
diaspora then it may cause the kin state to feel pressured and responsible when ethnic diaspora is
seriously threatened (King and Melvin 1999-2000). Transborder ethnic ties and networks can
also possibly increase the insecurity of host states and affect the incorporation of diaspora into
political and economic domestic affairs in host states (Sorrentino 2003).
Homelands are more likely to help and interact with their diaspora when there is threat to
their diaspora from other international players (Sorrentino 2003). Hungary and Ukraine support
their diaspora in neighboring countries. The constitutional duties of the Ukrainian president
include "securing the national-cultural, spiritual, and linguistic needs of Ukrainians abroad”
(King and Melvin 1999-2000, 125). Hungary and Ukrainian laws give special entitlements to
their diaspora when they visit the country. The law protects co-ethnic interest and maintains
awareness of their national identity, while still encouraging living in a host state. This is called
“a ‘transnational’ or a cross border form of ‘citizenship’” (Steward 2009, 3). However, the Status
Law (Steward 2003) negatively affected some states such as Slovakia and Slovenia. Still,
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support from the homeland may create more problems for diaspora. For example, China’s
“nationality’ law has been supported by adoptive states to minimize the participation of diaspora
in their own domestic affairs. The Chinese diaspora depends heavily on China for support, which
gives an opportunity to the adoptive states to minimize the incorporation of diaspora in their
domestic affairs (Sorrentino 2003).
The strong ties between a homeland and diaspora may even result in a conflict with the
host state. The politics of the kin state are more essential than the politics of the host state
because kin states are able to influence a diaspora’s actions with their policies. However, ethnic
linkages do not ensure that kin states will act as a protector or provide economic resources for
the ethnic war in the host state. In fact, most kin states in Eastern European countries ignored the
interest of co-ethnic groups in 1991 (King and Melvin 1999-2000). This means interaction
between all homelands and diaspora is not always consistent (King and Melvin 1999-2000 and
Sorrentino 2003). Sorrentino claims that cultural similarities and power impact the relationship
of a homeland/diaspora and their cooperation. However, the authors do not explain what happens
in a situation in which ethnic groups do not have a homeland state to protect their interest in host
state. What role does the dynamic of ethnic groups play for states’ behavior and decisionmaking?
Davis and Moore (1997) point out the importance of the status of co-ethnic groups in
these countries. If members of an ethnic group hold higher policy positions or are more
politically active and organized in one state than members of the same group in a different state,
does this affect the states’ relationship? The group that is incorporated into the power structure of
a state will force or demand both their state and the other state to modify their policies and
correct the status differential. The authors claim that the foreign policy of both countries would
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be more conflicted, less collaborative, and hold a generally negative attitude (Davis and Moore
(1997). This argument assumes that the relatively powerful ethnic group will protect the interests
of their co-ethnic groups. Even though these groups are co-ethnic, we cannot assume that all
ethnic groups will help or cooperate when another group is having an ongoing ethnic conflict.
One reason for their non-cooperation could be that diaspora is limited in capabilities.
Wayland points out that while the Sri Lankan conflict was supported by diaspora, that
support was outweighed by the pressure from Norway, Japan, Canada and international
organizations such as the World Bank and the European Commission, who were pushing for
reconstruction and involved in the Sri Lankan peace process. This example demonstrates that
transnational ethnic networks are not alone in impacting and influencing conflict (Wayland
2004). Nevertheless, not all rebels receive support from the international community. When and
under which circumstances do ethnic conflicts receive external support?
2.4 Why States and Ethnic Groups do or do not Support Violent Ethnic Groups
There are varying reasons for states’ support of violent groups. States will react and
respond more strongly to an enemy closer in proximity than one located further away. This
means that states are more sensitive to regional crises in neighboring countries. This translates to
a higher likelihood of state support of violent groups within neighboring countries that they
perceive as a potential threat (Saideman 2001). Pakistan has supported both the ATTF and the
BLTF against India because it perceives India as a potential threat (Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham (2011).
Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham (2011) argue that strong and very weak rebel groups
tend to get less external support. Strong rebel groups gather resources from domestic sources.
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Even though they can gain more resources they will less likely accept external support because
they do not want to be constrained or imposed upon by external actors. The very weak rebels
would rather gain international attention and support but because they are too weak, external
actors tend to not invest too much.
Ethnic or religious ties also play an important role in ethnic mobilizations and support. If
a violent group has a large transnational constituency of support then states are more likely to
support the group. For instance, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and violent
Palestinian groups receive wide support from co-ethnic groups and diaspora due to their religious
and ideological commitments. Moreover, group sympathizers, especially in neighboring
countries, force their states to support or defend their group during the conflict. Tamil Nadu in
India demanded India’s government to support the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka’s
conflict (Jenne 2007, Saideman 1997, Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). This suggests
that states may support violent groups to satisfy their constituencies or to control their minorities.
Nevertheless, states sometimes support violent groups due to their political interests.
Transnational linkages and interstate rivalries are very important for support for rebel
groups, and those conflicts in which the government side has external support are much more
likely to also result in support for the rebels (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, 32). States
that have interstate rivalries tend to support violent groups instead of invading a country. In this
way states avoid potential costs such as military economic costs, casualties, risk of invasion, and
political and economical sanctions (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Gartner and Seguta
1998). Supporting violent ethnic groups against the targeted state also functions as a tool to
destabilize the targeted country (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). Sudan supported the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been involved in military conflict with Uganda.
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Uganda also supported the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) against Sudan. Both
countries used these violent groups against each other to weaken and destabilize their enemy
(Prunier 2004). However, it is not always in the states’ or groups’ best interest to support violent
groups.
If violent ethnic groups are either militarily weak or fractured then states tend to not
support these groups. States or groups may perceive these violent groups as incapable of
challenging their host state. Furthermore, violent groups possessing strong central leadership and
coordination capabilities have more potential to attract the support of states and their co-ethnic
groups (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011). Equally important are shared goals and
preferences between violent groups and both ethnic groups and states. If group preferences or
goals do not match with those of the state or co-ethnic groups, they typically do not support the
violent group. However, ethnic and religious ties to violent groups may decrease and diverge
preferences, “since a common worldview and shared cultural understandings often indicate
similar preferences” (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, 715, Davis, Moore 1997,
Saideman 2001). In this case, co-ethnic groups may still support violent groups due to their
ethnic ties. Nevertheless, states may not support groups if they do not have either religious or
ethnic ties.
Another big reason for states’ willingness to support violent groups is that states may lose
some or partial autonomy over the goal they perceive. In another word, a state may grant
permission to a group to conduct and use its territory, which increase a state’s risk of losing
“agency and autonomy over the objectives” (Saleyhan 2010 and Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham 2011, 716). However, if a state’s benefit of supporting violent ethnic group exceeds
the cost (loss of some autonomy, etc.), then states may be convinced to support the group.
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
The main question driving this inquiry is why and when the same ethnic national groups
support or do not support co-ethnic violent groups? If so, how and under what conditions do they
support or reject support? Does external pressure or threat have any effect on a group reluctance
to provide support? In order to approach these questions with greater specificity this section will
delineate the variables used in this paper, as well as present explanations for their use. Following
this organization, possible problems with the theory will be examined in light of former studies
and a set of hypotheses will be introduced for future testing.
I will examine the reasons why and under what conditions ethnic groups support violent
ethnic groups. It is clear that there are many possible explanations for my question. However, it
is obvious ethnic ties or a sense of common identity is the key factor for groups to support one
another; however that does not necessarily presuppose a common goal. The authors (Manzano
and Sanchez, Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Davis, Moore 1997, and Saideman 2001)
argue that ethnic and religious ties to violent groups may decrease and divert preferences and
differences, allowing groups to support one another. For states, cost benefit analysis plays a
central role for their decision to support or not support a violent group. These analyses also
suggest that mutual interest is not always necessary for a state or group to support their co-ethnic
groups. Nevertheless, we cannot assure that all ethnic groups will help and support when another
group is having an ongoing ethnic conflict. Existing literature give some explanation for noncooperation among co-ethnic groups such as weak and fracture groups may not seen as capable
of doing or changing anything or no clear leadership may discourage groups to not support.
Existing literature also reveals that external threat or interstate rivalries influence a state’s
decision to support violent groups (Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Gartner and Seguta
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1998, Saideman 2001). States believe that the benefit of supporting a violent group is higher
than the cost. This is crucial as such threats often lead to a state’s withdrawal and relinquishment
of its support in light of the possible great loss incurred should the state involve itself in a direct
confrontation. Does threat perception apply to non-cooperation among co-ethnic groups? In other
words, if there is external pressure or a direct threat due to a group’s cooperation with their coethnic violent groups, how do those co-ethnic violent groups react? Do they still support their coethnic groups if the cost of continued support of a violent group is higher than before?
My analyses demonstrate that ethnic group perception of threat can be important, thus
requiring clarification as to how threat convinces a co-ethnic group to support or not support
violent groups. In determining when groups decide to support and not support, I am using the
theory that group cooperation based on utility is a key component for a group decision, which
measures whether the benefits of their participation exceed the cost (Hechter, Friedman, and
Appelbaum 1982). I believe that previous studies that employed this model did not appropriately
account for the effects of external forces on group or state decisions. The expectation that utility
benefit would be an important factor for a group’s willingness or unwillingness to support is
understandable, but the former assertion is not as clear-cut as Hechter, Friedman, and
Appelbaum (1982) contend. This theory is largely based on rational choice theory, which states
that all groups / states and leaders act rationally because maximizing their interest is the most
important factor in their decision. States and co-ethnic groups may be forced to act in certain
way because external actors (this can be either the host state that have the ethnic war or
hegemonic or strong-influential state/s or the other neighboring host countries that accommodate
co- ethnic groups) may threaten groups for a great loss. For instance, should external actors be
involved, ethnic groups may face greater losses than gains while supporting their ethnic groups,
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since groups are limited in capabilities.2 These losses may be territorial, economic, political, or
some other form. Therefore, group still make decisions rationally by conducting cost and benefit
analysis of the situation however their decision is influenced largely based on external pressures
and threats.
The type or level of support and the method in response to external pressure possessed by
the same ethnic groups will be defined as dependent variables. Examples of the type of support
to be examined include the following: (1) when one group is under armed attack the other group
does not help or when groups are equally threatened, they do not act together. Help is hereby
defined as financial aid (money or other means); actively fighting against the enemy; supporting
group members and leaders; military and economic agreements; helping them to gather weapons;
supporting them in the international; (2) Support also includes meetings between state or group
leaders and oral statements of support (some of these measures are adopted from Davis and
Moore 1997). For states, they may ask a group to leave their territory or cut military or financial
aid to the violent group.
The independent variable examined in this analysis will be the existence of external
threat or pressure on ethnic groups. The type of external threat or pressure is divided into the
following different factors: (1) threats of military intervention or minor verbal conflict and
threats by the host state, including loss of jobs or prison sentences; (2) threats of discontinued
economic support between the state and group or between state and state, including canceling
economic agreements and ending economic activities (which itself can include ceasing the
provision of arms and weapons or direct financial aid); (3) threats of international pressure such
2

I treat and view groups as a single unitary actor engaged in the decision-making process. This definition was drawn from rational choice theory,

which defines states as unitary actors (Doyle 1997). Realists argue that unitary actors act to maximize gains and minimize losses (Morgenthau
1967). Therefore, the group decision can be made by a person or small group by choosing the set of alternatives that most maximizes utility.
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as diplomatic, political, and economic sanctions. These measures of direct interaction can
collectively lead to either support or conflict (some of these measures are adopted from Davis
and Moore 1997). The form of external actors will be divided into two broad categories; one is
state actors and second is non-state actors. Non-state actors are defined as group leaders and
influential and powerful group members. Group leaders have a significant impact on state and
groups’ decisions to support or not.
3.1 From these frameworks, the following hypotheses can be extrapolated for testing:
1. Groups that have strong ethnic ties will likely support each other.
According to studies conducted by Jenne (2007), Saideman (1997), Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham (2011), Manzano and Sanchez, Wayland (2004), King and Melvin (1999) and
many others, ethnic ties play an important role in ethnic mobilization and support. I will test this
argument to see if ethnic ties always convince groups to cooperate.
2. A host state’s relationship with a violent ethnic group impacts the level of
cooperation among co-ethnic groups.
For example; strong ties with either a neighboring country or a country supportive to a
certain violent group will likely influence cooperation among co-ethnic group. The opposite can
also be true. Moreover, if groups receive greater internal threats from their host state (due to their
support for co-ethnic violent groups) there will likely be non-cooperation among co-ethnic
groups.
3. The level of external pressure or threat (from low to high)3 from a neighboring
will decrease the level of cooperation among co-ethnic groups.

3

The type of external threat or pressure is divided into the following different factors: (1) threats of military intervention or
slight verbal conflict and threat; (2) threats of discontinued economic support between the state and group or between state and
state, including canceling economic agreements and ending economic activities (which itself can include ceasing the provision of
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The foundational hypothesis for this study is summarized in the above statement. There
is a significant foundation to my theory that claims external pressure creates the initial
foundation for a lack of cooperation within groups. This hypothesis is based in part on the claims
of Axelrod and Hammond (2003), which conclude that out-group hostility increases in a
competitive situation and when there is an external threat. My assumption tests whether external
pressure will provide reason for groups and states to not support a violent group.
4. Past experiences of conflict or cooperation between co-ethnic groups will likely
influence future cooperation and non-cooperation.
This hypothesis largely drew from Saideman (2001). Moreover, these hypothesizes are
also one part of Larson’s (1997) argument. Larson argues that the negative perception and
security dilemma causes groups to see each other as “us” and “them”. Once this logic takes root
in a group it becomes very difficult to collaborate together. This logic can also be applied to past
interactions. If the groups previously cooperated for a greater gain and left with a good
impression then we can expect them to cooperate again or at least not act against one another.
However, if the groups or states fought against one another in the past, again for a greater gain,
there might exist negative feelings between the two groups and states, making it difficult to
cooperate. The root of the problem is still a cost benefit analysis that impacts groups and states’
decisions and remains influenced by external actors. Therefore, I expect to find correlation
between external pressure or threat and cooperation, regardless of whether pressure is for or
against cooperation. I will also examine whether past cooperation or non-cooperation among
groups and states in the past has had and/or will have positive or negative impacts for future
cooperation.

arms and weapons or direct financial aid); (3) threats of international pressure such as diplomatic, political, and economic
sanctions.
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5. Competition or struggle for group leadership or for political and economical
power (if there is more than one group) will likely cause non-cooperation among
the same co-ethnic groups.
This hypothesis has adopted from Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham’s (2011)
argument, which suggests that groups possessing strong central leadership and coordination
capabilities have more potential to attract the support of states and their co-ethnic groups. I argue
that competition between groups for leadership, economic, political power, or any combination
of these, will decrease the likelihood of group cooperation.
6. Different dialects between the same ethnic groups will likely decrease the level of
cooperation.
7. Religious differences within the same ethnic groups will likely decrease the level
of cooperation.
Hypothesis 6 and 7 implemented from multiple authors (Manzano and Sanchez,
Salehyan, Gleditsch, Cunningham 2011, Davis, Moore 1997, and Saideman 2001) who argue
that ethnic and religious ties to violent groups may decrease and divert preferences and
differences, allowing groups to support one another. This argument was adopted because
religious and linguistic differences may cause groups to not cooperate4.
8. The level of similar ideologies (from low to high) will increase the level of
cooperation between co-ethnic groups.

4

Majority of Kurds are Sunni however one third of are Shia Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran (Turkey: a
country study 1995, Al-Khoei 2009). However, the Shia Kurds emphasize their ethnic identities more than religious
identities. Moreover, “the Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iran- make comparatively less of a distinction between
themselves regardless of religion or sect” (Al-Khoei 2009). There are also linguistic divisions among Kurdish
groups. Kurmanji is spoken in Turkey, Syria and northern Iraq. Sorani dialect is more in central Iraq and Iran.
Zazaki is spoken in eastern Turkey and Gorani dialect in northeastern Iraq. Majority of Kurds speak Kurmanci
(Kaya 2011, Berberoglu 2004). In my examination, I did not find any significant result show that Kurdish ethnic
groups do not cooperate due to their religious identities and linguistic differences.
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Hypothesis 8 was adopted from Jenne 2007, Saideman 1997, Salehyan, Gleditsch,
Cunningham 2011. They argue that violent groups receive wide support from co-ethnic groups
and diaspora due to their ideological commitments. I will test whether or not differences in
ideologies influence group cooperation. My definition of ideologies will be political, covering
both conservative and liberal (leftist and rightist) ideologies.
9. Great powers can cause or prevent co-ethnic groups to cooperate.
Hypothesis 9 has drawn from Wayland’s (2004) argument. The author argues that
diaspora is limited in capabilities and international organizations and powerful countries help
diaspora during peace processes. I believe that the international community can also influence
the relationship of co-ethnic groups. Great powers such as the US, USSR or Soviet Union, and
China can solve the dispute between co-ethnic groups, which may cause cooperation. Or they
can pressure groups to not cooperate or help.
For this paper, I will mainly focus on examining hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 9. I will only
be able to highlight and address the other hypotheses, however, due to space constraints.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN
Table 1 Violent Kurdish Groups
Country

Violent Kurdish Groups

Year that Established

Turkey

PKK

1974

Iraq

KDP

1946

PUK

1975

KDPI

1945

Iran

20

Syria

KOMALA

1967-68

PJAK

1997

KDPS

1957

I will examine the causal relationship between external pressure and non cooperation
through a structured comparative study of Kurdish ethnic groups, which are Kurdistan Workers
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) from Turkey, the Kurdish Autonomous region in
Iraq, PJAK (the Militant Party for Free of Kurdistan) from Iran, and Kurds from Syria. Syrian
Kurds and Iranian Kurds are helping the PKK in their goal of independence. Nonetheless, the
PUK and the KDP have supported the PKK, though they eventually withdrew support
(McKeirnan 2006). In fact, violence has occurred between the PUK-KDP coalitions and the PKK
because Turkey threatens and forces these groups to not just cooperate, but also to act violently
against the PKK (McKeirnan 2006). There is variation in group cooperation; therefore it is
essential to examine the reasons.
The time period from my examination stretches from 1923 to 2012, however, I will
primarily focus on two periods of cooperation among Kurdish groups: the mid 1980s, when the
PKK was established in Syria; and after 1999, when Syria shut down the PKK camps and
established their camps in Northern Iraq (Hooper 2007). Moreover, PJAK was also established
late 90s. The reason for my time selection is that most violent Kurdish groups established
themselves and became active after the 1980s. After 1999, the PKK’s relocation from Syria to
Iraq will allow me to examine group cooperation within those states. I will also primarily focus
on cooperation or non-cooperation among violent ethnic groups’ such as the PKK, PUK, KDP
(now known as the Kurdish Autonomous region), and PJAK, because I am more interested in the
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dynamic and relationship between violent ethnic groups. My study will not examine cooperation
or non-cooperation between Iranian and Syrian Kurds due to geographical restriction which may
restrain their ability to cooperate. Furthermore, it is difficult to examine Syrian group
cooperation with other Kurdish groups due to many fractions and small groups. Therefore, my
examination of Syrian Kurdish cooperation with co-ethnic violent Kurdish groups in neighboring
countries will be based on general reactions to and support of Syrian Kurds from these groups.
I will use qualitative research design methods to develop my argument. Possible
methodological arguments regarding this project might include the difficulty of proving whether
groups support or not, based on external threat or pressure. In order to combat this ambiguity, I
will examine most similar-cases (the Kurdish groups that cooperate and do not cooperate), which
allows me to control many variables, such as history, culture, and religion. These control
variables are important because by controlling them I can avoid analyzing groups that do not
cooperate based on these factors. Comparing the most similar groups will allow us to see if
group decisions towards non-cooperation are truly made based on external pressure.
The PKK is generally considered a strong violent group with clear leadership and no past
experience of fragmentation. Examining the PKK will allow me to control for groups’ inability
to gain state or co-ethnic group support based on their fragmentation, weaknesses, or lack of
clear leadership. Moreover, Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq all have identity issues. They
all struggle to gain their ethnic rights and freedoms which will permit me to control groups that
do not share a common identity or goals. Furthermore, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey all have
Kurdish population in their territory and have all been challenged by their Kurdish diaspora. This
will allow me to control for states that do not have ethnic problems, which may allow them to act
more freely.
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4.1 Way to Measure My Hypothesis
I will examine past experiences of support and non-support among groups and states
toward violent groups in my empirical analysis. I will research this through process tracing and I
will gather information from multiple political, historical, and scholarly works.
My first measure is to define the role of the U.S. in Kurdish case. I will examine the
relationship between the U.S. and Kurds in different region. For example: how does Turkey’s
relationship with the U.S influence Iraqi Kurds decision-making toward the PKK? I will look
into present and historical records to examine importance of the U.S in the Kurdish problem. I
will also explore all meetings, statements and agreements between the U.S. and countries that are
mentioned above and those between the U.S. and Kurds in regards to the Kurdish issue. This
examination will demonstrate the level of external pressure and the external actors’ roles in coethnic behavior and decision-making.
I will also examine the number of military interventions against these violent groups (the
PKK, KDP, PUK, and PJAK) to stop their activities (e.g. the number of Turkish military
interventions against the PKK in Syria and Northern Iraq). This is one of the most appropriate
measures for my study, which predicts that an external pressure exists. If the number of
interventions is high, then that would suggest that Turkey or other countries represent a constant
external threat to Kurdish cooperation because - due to violent behavior of neighboring countries
or external actors - Kurdish groups and states would be afraid to support the PKK. This study
could potentially reveal that groups may support a government that intervenes to prevent military
interventions in their region. To explore this, I will collect information from historical records
and newspapers.
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Natali’s (2010) book The Kurdish Quasi-state, Fielding-Smith’s (2010) and
Bhadrakumar’s (2007) articles, the Middle East Reports, and other economic news provide us
with information about the role of neighboring governments and companies in influencing the
level of support. Higher levels of economic involvement will demonstrate that these countries
have more leverage or potential to influence group cooperation. For instance, the economic
agreement between Turkish companies in Northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdish groups will illustrate
that Turkey has the capability to influence and pressure the Kurdish government and/or groups in
Northern Iraq.
I will examine the number of meetings between ethnic groups and neighboring countries
that have a large population of the same ethnic groups (e.g. the meetings that have occurred
between leaders of the Turkish government and Iraqi Kurdish groups from 2000 to 2011) and the
number of meetings between state leaders and the PKK and explore the reasons for each visit. If
the number of visits is high we can determine that there is a high level of interaction between
these governments and groups. It will also determine the foundation of their relationship. I will
collect the number of visits and information about the motivations behind the visits from
historical records and newspapers.
I will also examine the language and attitude of leaders toward other governments or
groups to specify their relationship and the level of pressure they experience to act against or
stop supporting the PKK (e.g. the language of Turkish leaders toward Iraqi government or the
Kurdish Regional Government). I will collect the information from a variety of newspapers,
including international, regional, and local newspapers, and from Kurdish web sites. Some of
these newspapers include Hurriyet, Zaman, Sabah, Radical, the New York Times, the
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Washington Post, and web sites such as KurdishMedia.com, KurdMedia.com, Kurds.com, and
the Kurdish Regional Government home page.

5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Kurdish nationalism started in the late Ottoman period. Nationalist movements were
“neither unified nor linear” (Klein, 2007, 137). Kurdish nationalism was fragmented due to the
long disputes of notable families and was also limited by Naqshbandi shaykhs (Ozoglu 2001).
There were several movements started by different actors who had different views about the
situation. Influenced by European nationalism sentiment, they created Kurdish clubs. The goal
of these clubs was “to protect the rights of Kurds,” however these rights were intended to protect
the privileges of the Kurdish tribal chiefs. After the Young Turk revolution in 1908 the goal had
changed to autonomy or cultural protection of Kurds. These clubs emphasized that “the
education, modernization and protection of the freedoms of the Kurdish people was important
not just for Kurdish society, but for the good of the empire overall” (Klein 2007, 139). This
demonstrates that clubs did not have separatist views. Most of these Kurdish nationalists were
Ottomanists until after WWI (Klein 2007).
These clubs did not begin to make political and national claims until 1918. Following the
formation of the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK), the club’s leaders desired
independence and/or autonomy. However, two years after its establishment, SAK split due to
ideological reasons among members (Ozoglu 2001). Ozoglu’s study demonstrates that “preexisting feuds between these families contributed greatly to this ideological split” (387), which
caused them to not cooperate.
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When the Ottoman Empire defeated by the Allied Powers and the treaty of Sevres signed
that promised the Kurds an independent homeland of their own. Nevertheless, the rise of Mustafa
Kemal in Turkey and British economic interest in Iraq did not let Kurdish people have their own
state (Entessar 1989).
5.1 Kurds from Turkey
Twenty percent of the Kurdish population lives in Turkey (Gunter 2000) and when
Ataturk and Ismet Inonu built the new nation, neither of them considered minorities. They
formed radical reforms such as having one official Turkish language and teaching Turkish
history exclusively. They denied the existence of minorities (Yavuz 2001). By doing this, they
ignored the existence of distinct ethnic groups like Kurds and other small groups. The Turkish
government even declared that Kurds were “mountain Turks who have forgotten their native
tongue and now returning to their Turkish origins” (Entessar 1989, 12-13).
The result of transforming a multi-ethnic empire to a nation-state created socio-political
problems in Turkey and the consequences of the transformation have seen within Kurdish tribes
and leaders. The state still ignored the Kurdish ethnicity. They preferred to portray them as been
backward and reactionary people who were a threat to the Turkish state (Yavuz and Gunter
2001). These prompted Turkey to start assimilation policies toward the Kurdish population. The
Turkish and Kurdish conflict started mid 1980s and has claimed at least 44,000 lives lost (Shaoul
2011).
Kurdish university students in Ankara and Kurdish intellectuals created the PKK and the
SPTK (the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan) in 1974, respectively. Abdullah Ocalan became
the first and only leader for the PKK. The SPTK supported a federal state that would include
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equal rights for both Kurds and Turks. On the other side, the PKK was a still is the most radical
Kurdish movement demanding for Kurdish autonomy and they achieved mass mobilization in
Southeast Anatolia. The organization had a large amount of workers and peasants due to social
ideas it contains (Entessar 1989). At first, the PKK began to demand for the Kurdish rights. It
also helped the Kurdish population acknowledge their Kurdish identity. The government did not
recognize the demand and arrested or killed whoever disagreed with the regulations of the
country. A coup in 1980 used violence and coercion against Kurdish people. These negative
actions strengthened and politicized Kurdish nationalism and identity (Yavuz 2001). Prior to the
military coup during the 1980s, the PKK left Turkey and fled to Syria where the training camps
were established by the PKK. After the 1980 coup, the PKK started the first attack against the
Turkish military in 1984 (Hassanpour 1994). The guerrilla success in the 1980s was due to
government repression, which leads to the mobilization and politicization of large masses into a
national movement.
Sadly, violence became the most prevalent problem in Turkey. The war worsened
between 1984 and 1991 and, “according to state statistics, since 1984, as many as 4,302 civil
servants, 5,018 soldiers, 4,400 civilians, and 23,279 the PKK terrorists were killed in the region,
and thousands wounded” (Yavuz 2001). The civil war destroyed 3,000 villages, leaving more
than 3,000,000 people displaced (Gunter 2000). The PKK was supported by foreign countries
such as Russia, Syria, and Greece. To the extreme, Syria became a military base for the PKK
(Yavuz and Gunter 2001). In 1998, in order to end Kurdish violence, the Turkish state threatened
to go to war with Syria if they did not expel the leader of the Kurdish movement, Ocalan, from
the country (Yavuz 2001).Ocalan was arrested in 1999 (Marcus 2007).
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5.2 Kurds from Syria
Syrian Kurds number about two-million people, making up ten percent of the population
(Sinclair and Kajjo. 2011). It is the largest ethnic population in Syria. Syrian Kurds speaks
Kurmanci which is the largest Kurdish dialect. Moreover, the majority of Syrian Kurds are
Sunnis. Syrian Kurds live mostly along the border of Turkey and Iraq where their fellow Kurds
live. This has had great influence on Syrian Kurds (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). Since, Syrian
Kurds do not have any border with Iranian Kurds, which suggest that they have less interaction
with Iranian Kurds5. In Syria, Kurds did not have any internal problems, as a result of “benign
rule of the French mandatory authorities”. However, tribal elements were seen along the Turkish
border. Syrian Kurds were sympathetic to the Kurdish raids in Ararat and Dersim (1937) in
Turkey. This alarmed the Turkish government and led it to replace some of the chiefs from the
border region. In 1946 the French withdrew from Syria.
In 1957, the Partiya Democrat a Kurdistan Suriye (KDPI) was established. Kurds still
were able to adapt to new changes in their political and living conditions until the establishment
of pan-Arabism in the 1960, which threatened and persecuted the members of the Democratic
Party of Kurdistan (DPKS). This party demanded for Kurdish representation, linguistic, and
cultural independence in Syria (Edmonds 1971; Ahmed and Gunter 2007). The Syrian
government banned Kurdish culture, language, music. Moreover, the public attacked the Kurds.
Nevertheless, Syrian Kurds’ nationalism was the weakest compared to Kurdish nationalism in
other countries. Some argue that Arab nationalism was important reason for weak Syrian
Kurdish nationalism, which attacked Kurdish nationalism (Ahmed and Gunter 2007).

5

My study will not examine cooperation or non-cooperation between Iranian and Syrian Kurds due to geographical restriction
which may restrain their ability to cooperate.
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Under the Assad regime, the government banned Kurds from using their languages for
publication or education. The regime also banned Kurdish political parties. Some Syrian Kurds
were even denied, or in some cases stripped, of their citizenship. These policies left Kurds to live
in a country in which they cannot own a home or a car, and face significant professional
obstacles (Marcus 2007). The Kurdish issue was not arguable (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). In the
1960s, the KDPS decided to use revolutionary means to gain freedom, however a small number
of Kurds joined. Members of KDPS were arrested, including leader Hamid Haj Darwish,
released ten months later. Many believed that Darwish collaborated with the Syrian government
that led the first split in 1965 within KDPS (Ahmed and Gunter 2007).
Osman Sabri created Partiya Demokrat a Kurdi li Suriye and Darwish established the
Partiya Demokrata Pesveru a Kurdi li Suriye. Sabri wanted to use revolutionary techniques
however Darwish was willing to use softer tactics to achieve Kurdish rights. Darwish also
cooperated with Talabani whereas Sabri supported Barzani. Nevertheless, there were more splits
within these organizations; again, organizations influenced by Iraqi Kurdish groups. Barzani
tried to unite and mediate between the parties, but unity was not possible. The reason for disunity
was tribal ties with political and ethnic connection and as well as ideological differences which
heightened it. The new party, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria, was established by Daham
Miro in 1972 which had strong ties with KDP. However, in 1972, many arrested and attacked
against Syrian Kurds, which scared the Syrian Kurdish movement. During this time, only a small
group favored use of violence. The KDPS split more by each decades during the 1970s, 80s and
90s. There are many small illegal Kurdish parties and there have not been many Kurdish groups
to openly ask for independence (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). For my study, it is difficult to
examine Syrian group cooperation with other Kurdish groups due to many fractions and small
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groups. Therefore, my examination of Syrian Kurdish cooperation with co-ethnic violent
Kurdish groups in neighboring countries will be based on general reactions to and support of
Syrian Kurds from these groups.
5.3 Kurds from Iraq
Approximately 3.7 million Iraqi Kurds live in Northern Iraq and one to two million
Kurds live in other part of Iraq (O’Leary 2002). After WWI, Iraq became a British mandate. The
League of Nations gave some flexibility to minorities and guaranteed the respect of Kurds in Iraq
(Edmonds 1971, 92). However, Britain forced its mandate and in order to stop resistance the
British army did not hesitate to use violence. In 1930, British troops killed dozens in the city of
Sulaimaniah to quell Kurdish protests. In the 1940s, the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish
state was supported by Soviets. However, the Soviets withdrew after nine months in exchange
for access to Iranian oil. This event temporarily ceased Kurdish movements in Iraq (McKiernan
2006).
In 1946, Iraqi Kurds formed the Kurdish Democratic Parties (KDP) by a tribal and leftist
nationalist leader called Mustafa Barzani. He was a military leader in 1946 for the Kurdish
Republic in Iran. KDP’s framework spread to Syria and Turkey shortly thereafter. Each aimed
for autonomy and democracy for its respective part of country (Hassanpour 1994). Suppression
and display of force lead to a war in 1961. The brutality of the Iraqi government’s operations led
to unification and solidarity among Kurdish people, causing a national uprising. The war
continued until 1970. In 1974, the KDP declared a Kurdish autonomous region and started the
war with the Iraqi Government. However, in 1975 Iran and the U.S ceased their support of the
KDP, which lead Barzani (leader of the KDP) to declare the end of the armed struggle. Many
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peshmergas (around 100,000 to 200,000) then fled to Iran. The leftists and the KTL claimed that
the KDP was unable to establish a successful movement. Leftist and Marxist ideologies also
influence the group to create the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 (Stansfield 2003
and Hassanpour 1994) and Talabani became the most influential and dominant leader for the
PUK. These two groups also different linguistically. PUK members largely speak Sorani whereas
KDP members speak Kurmanci (Gunter 1998). The KDP controlled the Dohuk region whereas
the PUK controlled Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyya, which together comprises about 75 percent
of the Iraqi Kurdish population (Hassanpour 1994).
After 1975, there was a great oppression against the Kurds. During the Iraq-Iran war,
both countries tried to use the Kurdish populations of both countries in their favor against the
opponent (McKeirnan 2006 and Hassanpour 1994). The ideological and political outlook caused
conflict between the PUK and the KDP (Natali 2010 and Hassanpour 1994). Iran was able to
push both parties to establish the Kurdistan Front in 1987 just before the Anfal genocide. Both
parties acted together against the Iraqi government. Later, Western countries got involved and
created a “safe haven” which transformed the Kurdish Regional Government. After the civil war
in 1994-98 between the PUK and the KDP, they started to run the joint government together
(Hassanpour 1994).
5.4 Kurds from Iran
In Iran Kurds are considered “a branch of the Iranian race”. Since Iran has a multiracial
mosaic they believe Kurds are part of Iran, therefore there is no Kurdish problem (Edmonds
1971, 99). Iranian Kurds number about seven percent of 68 million people (Marcus 2007). In
Iran all languages, including Kurdish, are allowed to be used. In spite of these open conditions,

31
events between 1918-22 and 1941-46 suggest that Kurds have faced persecution and
imprisonment for certain activities (Edmonds 1971, 99). Furthermore, the majority of Iranian
Kurds are Sunni Muslims and they have been discriminated by the Shi’a population in Iran
(Gunter 2003). Iranian Kurds established a Kurdish state in the city of Mahabad in 1946 with the
help of the Soviet Union. Many Iraqi Kurds also played an active role in governing and in the
military; Mustafa Barzani became the military leader in the Kurdish state (Nassanpour 1994).
The Kurdish state ended less than a year after the Soviet Union’s withdrawal (Iranian Kurdistan
2008).
The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was established in 1945. The party aimed
for autonomy for Iranian Kurds and the use of the Kurdish language in school and
administration. However, Kurdish rebels were crushed in 1966 and 1967. The reestablishment of
the party did not occur until 1973 (The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) 2000-2012 and
Gunter 2003). The Komala established itself during the Kurdish uprising between 1967-68. The
Komala had leftist and Marxist ideologies and remained informal until the 1980s. The Komala’s
ideas were far more ambitious than the ideas of the KDPI. The Komala’s actions increased due
to the Iranian government capture of rebel areas in 1986 (Entessar 1992). The leader of the
KDPI, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, was assassinated (Ahmed and Gunter 2007). Iranian Kurds
(KDPI and Komala) supported the Iranian Revolution because they were suppressed and
discriminated during the shah regime. Kurds were hoping that revolution would provide them a
Kurdish autonomous rule. Nevertheless, Khomenini saw these claims as a threat to his newly
established government (Gunter 2003).
Iran and Turkey claimed that the PJAK, a “moderate wing of the PKK”, was established
and based in the Qandil Mountains in Northern Iraq (Gunter 2007 and Marcus 2007). The PJAK
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states that the organization was founded in 1997 by students who aim for peaceful
peacefu solutions.
PJAK influenced by socialist revolutions of Russia and tthey
hey were motivated by both the KRG
and the PKK nationalist movement. They tried to build a Kurdish national identity in Iran,
however the Iranian government harassed the group considerabl
considerably,
y, causing the group’s leaders
and members to move to Northern Iraq in 1999. The area that the PJAK settled is the PKK slopes
of Mount Qandil (Brandon 2006)
2006). PJAK signed a seize fire with the Iranian government since
s
September 2011 (Iran/Turkey:
Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan 2011).

6. COOPERATION AMONG K
KURDISH CO-ETHNIC GROUPS

6.1 Syrian Kurds

The PKK
Syrian Kurds

Turkey

The Syrian
Government

Figure 1 The Cooperation between the PKK, Syrian Kurds and Syrian Government against
Turkey (1984-1999)
The PKK was supported by foreign countries such as Russia, Syria, and Greece. To the
extreme that Syria became a military base for the PKK (Yavuz and Gunter 2001). Both the
Syrian Kurds and the Syrian government significantly helped the PKK. Some Syrian Kurds
might not fight on the side of the PKK, but they have long offered both material and ideological
ide
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sympathy and support. Some Syrian Kurds would fight with the PKK and profess “‘Ocalanism’,
the ideology of the PKK chief” (McKeirnan 2006, 149). In the 1990s, Turkish intelligence
estimated that 25 percent of PKK members were Syrian Kurds and that around 7,000 to 10,000
Syrian Kurds joined the PKK and did not come back to Syria (Ahmed and Gunter 2007).
The Syrian government encouraged Syrian Kurds to join the PKK, which caused the
group leader, Abdullah Ocalan, to condemn Syrian Kurds for their national struggle and even
accept the Syrian government’s claim that “most Kurds originated outside Syria (Ahmed and
Gunter 2007, 302). The PKK travelled inside Syria and collected money. The Kurdish Syrian
students were very excited by the PKK and the idea of an independent Kurdish state. Kurds in
Syria were not politically active and state policies made it difficult for them to act against the
Syrian government. Moreover, some Syrian Kurds have relatives across the border in Turkey,
which also motivates them to help the PKK. Syrian Kurdish support for the PKK was and is
“more tacit than overt” (Marcus 2007, 59). Even Syrian leaders sent their troops to fight against
Kurdish uprising in Iraq. In fact, some Syrian-Kurdish families would send their sons to fight in
Iraq and Iran (McKiernan 2006). Moreover, the Syrian government discriminated Kurds in every
branch of government (Edmonds 1971).
The reason for the Syrian Kurds lack of military involvement in Syria in the battle for
their rights has two explanations. Some believe “we have no mountains, so we cannot fight here”
(McKeirnan 2006, 147-151). Some state that “no one wanted trouble with the [Syrian]
government” (McKeirnan 2006, 147). One PKK militant reports, “it was always clear we (the
PKK) wouldn’t take any action that was against Syria. There was no decision. We just knew that
we couldn’t do anything proper… that’s it” (Marcus 2007, 59). Moreover, even though, Iraqi
Kurds have strong ties with Syria, the PUK and KDP have neither supported nor pressured the
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Syrian government to improve rights for Syrian Kurds because the Syrian government supported
the PUK (Gunter 2000). This position stems from the groups’ desire to avoid harming their
relationship with Syria.
In 1998, in order to end Kurdish violence, the Turkish state threatened to go to war with
Syria if they did not expel the leader of the Kurdish movement, Ocalan, from the country (Yavuz
2001). Also during this time, the U.S. helped Turkey against the PKK. The U.S. and Turkey
pressured Syria to expel the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan (Gillis 2004). Egypt warned
Syria that Turkey is not bluffing. Syria told Ocalan to leave the country and he complied in 1998.
He was captured in 1999 with the help of CIA (Marcus 2007).Yet, the U.S. insisted that Turkey
improve Kurdish citizens’ well being and peacefully solve the Kurdish problem (Gillis 2004).
Nevertheless, the PKK still have strong ties with two of the parties and presently maintain some
presence in northern Syria and some Syrian Kurds still fight with the PKK. After Ocalan’s arrest,
the Syrian Government signed the Adana agreement. With this agreement, both countries
decided to have common security politics. Syria banned the activities of the PKK and PYD (the
Syrian Kurdish political party). The Syrian Government acknowledged that the PKK is a terrorist
organization, arresting and returning its members to Turkey (Pacal 2012).
Bashar Assad came to power in 2001 he also improved the political and economic
dialogue with Turkey. They signed many economic and security agreements, including one “to
jointly combat crime and terrorism” (Eligur 2006, 2). Between 2002 and 2003, “Turkey’s exports
to Syria increased by 37 percent and trade between the two countries [grew] considerably,
exceeding $800 million” (Eligur 2006, 2-3) In 2003, the Syrian government carried out military
operations against the PKK along the Turkish border and turned captured PKK members over to
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the Turkish government. Both countries also supported the territorial integrity of Iraq and shared
the fear of an autonomous Kurdish state in Iraq (Eligur 2006).
It is clear that the host state’s relation with the violent group was the main hypothesis as
it explains the cooperation between Syrian Kurds and the PKK. The Syrian government had a
good relationship with the PKK. Since Assad supported Kurdish rights in Turkey and had been
helping the PKK, neither the PKK and Iraqi Kurds, nor Syrian Kurds wanted to upset the Syrian
government. Moreover, Syrian Kurds were not punished or prosecuted if they helped the PKK.
This absence of fear or pressure has allowed Syrian Kurds to help fellow Kurds (the PKK) in
their fight for independence. Furthermore, the close ethnic ties between Syrian and Turkish
Kurds also played an important role in facilitating co-ethnic group cooperation. My analysis
demonstrates that Turkey can pose considerable threat to any group or country if they help the
PKK. Further, it also reveals that relationships can be reversed if any country or group
cooperates with or helps the PKK. These incidents clarify that the Syrian state’s attitude towards
the PKK or Iraqi violent ethnic groups impacts the level of cooperation among Kurdish group.
Furthermore, the PKK and Iraqi Kurdish groups try to avoid upsetting their relationship with
Syria due to the support they receive for their activities, even if that means not supporting – and
in some cases, discouraging - Syrian Kurds’ demand for autonomy and any activities carried out
by Syrian Kurds against the Syrian government.
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6.2 Iraqi Kurds
Table 2 Timeline for Iraqi Kurdish Groups’ Activities
Years

Groups’ Activities

1946

1946 The KDP Established in Iraq

1975

The PUK created by Talabani in Iraq

1983-88

The PKK and KDP signed Principles of

Neighboring States

Solidarity

The treaty of Principles of Solidarity Ended
(1988)
1989

The PUK and PKK signed Protocol of
Understanding (ended within a year)

1988 -93 The KDP and PUK Cooperated against
Saddam
1994 -98 Civil War between the PUK and KDP

The PUK and Iran cooperated
against the KDP (1996)

The PUK and KDP Signed a Peace Treaty
(1998)

The KDP cooperated with Saddam
Hussein against PUK (1996)

Turkish Forces and the KDP
against PUK and PKK (1995-97)
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2005

The PUK and KDP signed the Strategic
Agreement

Note: The information gathered from MAR (2010), Olson (1996), Emin (2012).
6.2.1 Iraqi Kurds and Turkish Kurds (1983-1989)
6.2.1.1 Principles of Solidarity and Protocol of Understanding
Table 3 Cooperation between the PKK and Iraqi Kurds (the KDP and PUK) (1983-89)
Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish Groups

The Agreement

Years

The KDP / PKK

Principles of Solidarity

1983-87

The PUK / PKK

Protocol of Understanding

1988-88

In 1983, the PKK and the KDP signed an agreement called the “Principles of Solidarity”.
These two groups agreed to commit themselves to protecting against all forms of imperialism.
They also decided to cooperate with “other revolutionary forces in the region and [to create] new
alliances” (Olson 1996, 51). The principles also: prohibit interference in internal affairs; express
the PKK and KDP’s commitment to nonviolent interaction with one another; and declare that if
one makes a mistake implementing its alliance and ignores a warning then the alliance will cease
to exist. This agreement was honored for some time and the PKK began to move towards and
establish their presence in northern Iraq, moving around easily (Olson 1996).
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The Principles of Solidarity agreement was essential for the PKK to launch an attack
against Turkey. Moreover, the PKK used Barzani’s relation with the Iranian government to
travel Iran. However, the relationship started to change in 1985 (Marcus 2007. In response,
Turkey deployed military operations in Northern Iraq. In 1983, the Turkish and Iraq
governments signed a “Frontier Security and Cooperation Agreement” which allowed Turkey to
enter 10 km to the Iraqi Territory with military operations (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011,
Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008). The first operation took place in 1983,
in which seven-thousand Turkish soldiers entered up to 5 km into Iraq. The second operation
occurred in October 1984 and targeted the PKK camps (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). The
Turkish military interventions in Northern Iraq against the PKK also destroyed Barzani’s bases
and killed Iraqi Kurds. The KDP demanded the PKK to change their bases, however the PKK
refused, later deciding to make some changes. This did not satisfy the Turkish government
(Marcus 2007). The third operation occurred in August 1986 and Turkish troops killed 100 Iraqi
Kurds and KDP members. In the fourth operation, in March 1987, 30 Turkish fighter jets
bombed PKK camps, killed many Iraqi Kurds, and destroyed many homes (Yirmi Altinci
Operasyon 2011, Marcus 2007). After two months, Barzani dismissed the agreement and
argued, “after all that has happened, it is absolutely impossible for the PKK to stay in the areas
under our control” (Marcus 2007, 105). Moreover, the PKK committed violent actions against
the Iraqi Communist Party, which supports the KDP. Barzani interpreted this as an attack on his
party (Marcus 2007). The violent PKK behavior against women and children and pressure from
Turkey played an important role in ending the PKK and KDP alliance in 1987. Meanwhile, one
year later, the PKK signed an agreement, called a “Protocol of Understanding”, with the PUK. It
aimed for unity, cooperation and joint actions; however the leader of the PUK feared supporting
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the PKK due to Turkey’s prior repeated military actions in Northern Iraq the PKK. This
agreement also ended within one year (Olson 1996). There were no Turkish operations in
Northern Iraq between 1988 to 1991 (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011).
These events illustrate that Kurds established cooperation because of sense of Kurdish
identity. Ethnicity obviously was the biggest reason for their cooperation. However, later, Iraqi
Kurdish groups withdrew from their agreements with the PKK due to a number of Turkish
military interventions in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Military threat becomes a big issue for
groups. Turkey becomes a great threat to Kurdish cooperation. The Turkish government
constantly bombed PKK camps and intervened militarily in Northern Iraq, causing Barzani and
Talabani, both set up in the region with their respective groups, to not cooperate with the PKK,
out of fear of facing the same Turkish military action. Although Turkish forces were bombing
the PKK camps, Iraqi Kurds also lost their lives and homes. Both the PUK and the KDP have
also been targeted due to their cooperation with the PKK. During the groups’ cooperation, there
were four Turkish military interventions in the Kurdish region between 1983 and 1987.
Following the Iraqi Kurdish groups’ withdrawal from cooperation with the PKK, Turkey ended
its military operations in the Kurdish region of Iraq. This demonstrates that when the level of
threat increases groups retract their assistance to other group(s).
6.2.1.2 Safe Haven the Civil War between the PUK and KDP (1991-1997)
During the Iran-Iraq war, the Islamic Republics of Iran and Iraq used Kurds as a tool to
revolt against each other. As a result, the Iraqi government destroyed more than 4,000 Kurdish
villages (McKeirnan 2006). Some even argue, “one-third of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan
had been depopulated” (Olson 1992, 477). At the end of the war, the Iraqi government used its
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own force, including the use of chemical weapons, against Iraqi Kurds. Some state that more
than 100,000 Kurds were killed in the 1980s when the U.S. was still aiding the Iraqi government
(Olson 1992 and McKeirnan 2006). In 1988, immediately after the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi
government began the Anfal campaign, which was carried out genocide against Kurdish people.
In spite of their different tactics and political ideas, the PUK and KDP worked together to control
the Kurdish areas, which demonstrates that ideological differences can be overcome when there
is a greater threat to both groups. However, Iraqi forces regained the territory back and many
Kurds fled to the mountains of Turkey and Iran. A few U.S. senators suggested trade sanctions
against Iraq, but were refused by the Reagan and Bush administrations. Bush even gave away
secret aid, close to $1 billion, to Iraq. Meanwhile, Kurds were not even able to have a meeting
with “a lower U.S. official” (McKeirnan 2006, 49).
The Gulf war changed the destiny of Iraqi Kurds. Security issues play an important for
U.S.-Turkish relations. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Turkey had a strong bilateral
relationship against the Soviet Union (Gillis 2004). The U.S. –Turkish relationship caused the
U.S. to overlook Kurdish problems and suffering in Turkey. The U.S. government supported the
military apparatus, which is seen as a “guardian of the state’s Turkish and secularist identity”
(Charountaki 2011, 133). During the Gulf War, Turkey significantly helped the U.S. The U.S.
was able to use Incirlik air base. Incirlik was essential to the U.S. mission. For that reason, the
U.S. Military Command Center (MCC) and F-15 pilots from Incirlik were and are sharing
information about PKK movements to Turkish intelligence, an interaction which forms a part of
the MCC agreement. Turkey constantly warned the U.S. to keep Iraqi Kurds in line and
encourage them to fight against the PKK. It is clear that the U.S. needed Turkish territory for the
mission and Turkey used this as an opportunity to weaken the PKK (McKeirnan 2006). Iraqi
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Kurds knew that the U.S. was the only country to protect them against Saddam therefore they
had to obey all supposed obligations. There would have been a greater loss (risk of being
dismantled by Saddam Hussein) had Iraqi Kurds decided to cooperate with the PKK. In that
case, neither the U.S. nor Turkey would have protected them against Saddam. Cooperating with
the PKK would have not secured their lives because the PKK lacked the power and capabilities
to protect their fellow Kurds.
The Gulf war also resulted in creation by the U.S. and UN of the “Safe Haven”, located
along the 36th parallel. The KDP and the PUK governed this safe haven zone together
(Hassanpour 1994 and Freedom House 2002). Iran did not support a de facto autonomous
Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, however Turkey was more eager due to the massive Kurdish
population from Iraq. In turn, Turkey developed policies to have more influence on the KDP and
PUK against the PKK (Olson 1992, Park 2003). During the 1990s, Turkey has used both military
interventions and economical dependency of Iraqi Kurds to pressure them to fight against the
PKK (McKeirnan 2006).
After establishment of the safe haven, Turkey started to play an important role for Iraqi
Kurds. After the first Gulf war, the UN placed sanctions against the Iraqi government. Yet
concurrently, the UN humanitarian program and U.S. humanitarian aid were established to help
Iraqi people. Turkey played a key role in its establishment because Turkey was the only country
that had control over the only open border-crossing point (Habur)6 into Iraqi Kurdistan passable
to humanitarian aid operations. Both governments renewed this relationship every six months
and the Turkish government’s approval was crucial (Natali 2010). Turkey pressured Western
countries not to support or recognize Iraqi Kurdistan otherwise they would block humanitarian
6

The Habur was the only place where Iraqi Kurds could trade, averaging about $ 150,000 per day (Olson 1996).
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aid. Sometimes, they did not hesitate to close the border for humanitarian aid, causing food
shortages and price increases. Illicit trading at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border provided 85
percent of the KRG’s revenues. The KRG also made around US $750 million from taxation at
the Iraqi-Kurdish-Turkish border (Natali 2010). Therefore, the survival of Iraqi people and Kurds
depended both upon the aid that was provided by western countries and the profits generated
from illicit trading. Therefore, it was unthinkable for Iraqi Kurds to cooperate with the PKK.
Doing so would have lead Turkey to close its border, effectively ceasing both the humanitarian
aid and illicit trading. For that reason, to maintain an open border, the KRG had a security
agreement with Turkey, which incorporated searches for PKK activities and members along the
border area (Natali 2010).
The Turkish military operation (fifth operation) occurred in April 1991. On September 11
October 25, 1991 Turkey had two (six and seven) operations. During these two operations the
KDP and YNK (Kurdish parties) helped Turkish forces (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). Iraqi
Kurds had a difficult time establishing their government due to Turkish military interventions.
During these operations, Iraqi Kurdish homes and people also would get hit by air strikes. Iraqi
Kurds interpreted these actions as a warning sign from Turkey to force the PKK to leave
Northern Iraq. Otherwise they would be in danger (Marcus 2007). Military operations convinced
Iraqi Kurds to help Turkey during the military procedures. In 1992, the PKK attacked the
Turkish military, killing 23 soldiers and five village guards. Turkey – with support from Iraqi
Kurdish fighters - responded by attacking the PKK. After two weeks, Talabani started to
negotiate with the PKK, but Barzani wanted to force the PKK out of the Northern Iraqi border
(Marcus 2007). In spring 1992, Turkish forces held their eighth operation. In October 1992,
Turkey deployed its ninth operation, involving with 15 thousand soldiers, tanks, helicopters, and
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air force support. In April 1994, the Turkish government performed its 10th operation, this time
with five-thousand soldiers. This time Turkey entered 15 km into Iraq. Turkey’s 11th operation
occurred in March 1995, utilizing 35 thousand soldiers, making it one of the largest military
interventions in Northern Iraq (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011).
During the civil war and operations with Turkey, KDP members would try to capture a
female PKK member alive because they believed that women ought to be at home instead of in
the field of battle. Moreover, some Kurdish Northern Iraqi ministers “resigned from local
parliament to protest Iraqi Kurds aiding Turkey against their ‘brother Kurds’” (McKiernan 2006,
74). This shows that fighting against the PKK was a big issue. Even though, Iraqi Kurds might
not have wanted to help the PKK, they did not want to fight against their fellow Kurds either.
This demonstrates that ethnic identities and ties play an important role in group attitudes and
positions even if the groups fight against one another.
During this time, the relationship between the Turkish government and Iraqi Kurds
improved drastically (Olson 1996). Barzani stated “we consider relations with Turkey to be
extremely vital” (Marcus 2007, 201). Talabani claimed that the PKK should reply optimistically
to Ozal’s statement on Kurdish rights and stop armed violence and instead solve problems
through dialogue. Talabani even stated “the Iraqi Kurds might want to be annexed by Turkey”
(Olson 1996, 52). Ocalan claimed that Barzani and Talabani betrayed the PKK by cooperating
with the Turkish government (Olson 1996). The Turkish government also tried to build a good
relationship with Iraqi Kurds it would allow Turkey greater influence in Northern Iraq. Turkey
forced both leaders to act against the PKK (Marcus 2007). Iraqi Kurds also understood that the
benefit of helping or taking sides with Turkey was greater than cooperating with the PKK.
Nevertheless, Iraqi Kurdish leaders tried to convince Turkey to solve the dispute through
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dialogue which reveals that Iraqi Kurds were unwilling to use violence against the PKK and nor
did they want Turkey to use violence against their fellow Kurds.
Later, the PKK had to relocate their camps. Turkey wanted to establish a buffer zone,
however Iraqi Kurds refused. They did not desire to arrange and provide a full-time border
patrol to keep out the PKK along the Iraqi/Turkish border. After a short time, the PKK returned
to their camps in Iraq. Iraqi Kurds ignored the action because they did not want to have another
war with the PKK. They also believed that this would turn Turkey’s attention to solely focus on
the PKK, removing their chance to undermine the Kurdish Regional Government. Furthermore,
the KDP and PUK also had internal problems that demanded their attention (Marcus 2007).
These drastic changes in circumstances, especially after the establishment of a safe haven
and the Iraqi Kurds’ newfound economic dependence on Turkey, seem to have played an
important role in chancing the attitude and relationship between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds. Turkey
tried to use the economic dependence of Iraqi Kurds as leverage to force them to act against the
PKK. Military interventions, which were not just harming the PKK but also Iraqi Kurds, were
another important reason for Iraqi Kurds to act against the PKK and force the PKK to relocate
their camps. Nevertheless, the sense of ethnic ties made it difficult for some Iraqi Kurds to act
against fellow Kurds. Even though fear may have been the cause for Iraqi Kurds to avoid helping
the PKK, they did not want to fight against their fellow Kurds either.
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6.2.1.3 The Civil War between the PUK and KDP (1991
(1991-1997)

The KDP
Turkey
Iraq

The PUK
The PKK
Iran
Syria

Figure 2 Alliances for the KDP and PUK and the Kurdish Civil War (1994-98)
In the 1990s,
s, the KDP and PUK worked together. However
However, a civil war broke out
between these groups in 1994 due to land dispute and tax collection (MAR 2010 and Abdulla
2011). This allowed the PKK to use Iraq as a sanctuary from the Turkish army. The PKK used
the territory that was mostly controlled by the KDP, which the PUK saw as a second stronghold
from which to fend off the KDP. The PKK and the PUK started to work together against KDP
members (Olson 1996 and McKeirnan 2006
2006). The war between the PKK and the KDP ended in
1995 via a ceasefire agreement.
ent. This displeased Turkey, who claimed
aimed that the PKK had
committed betrayal.. Nevertheless, Barzani ignored the claims because he needed to focus on the
war with Talabani (Marcus 2007). These events show that groups sometimes act together against
another group if they perceive cooperation as more beneficial for them against a greater threat.
threat
The PKK wanted to use a territory controlled by the KDP while the PUK sought to ally itself
with the PKK in order to have gain more leverage against the KDP,, which it viewed as an enemy
and a threat to its existence.. The peace agreement between the PKK and the KDP was also
established because the KDP perceived the PUK as a greater threat to its survival than the PKK.
Clearly threat perception played an important role in group
up alliance and enemy formation.
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The US feared instability of region and shift the balance of powers. As a result, in 1995,
it organized a meeting however, it could not solve the dispute. Later, The KDP also allied itself
with the Turkish army and Iraqi government against the PKK and the PUK (Olson 1996 and
McKeirnan 2006). The PUK got help from Iran. In return, the PUK allowed Iran to attack Iranian
Kurds sheltering within its territory (Abdulla 2011). To strengthen its position and to retake Irbil
from PUK, Barzani cooperated with Saddam. Barzani defended his act referring to the PUK
agreement with Iran. Kurdish fronts were being both militarily and politically self-destructive
(Olson 1996, Gunter 1998 and McKeirnan 2006).
The civil war between the KDP and PUK illustrates that economical interest and gains
can be extremely important reasons to act against each other. During the conflict, group interest
motivated groups to ally themselves with any government (such as the Iraqi government) to have
leverage against other group. Cooperation between the PKK and PUK was also motivated by
groups’ gains and threat. The PUK allied itself with the PKK to have an advantage over the
KDP. The KDP agreed to a ceasefire with the PKK, in order to be able to move effectively
against the PUK. These events show that group cooperation is about group interest and gains.
6.2.1.4 The Washington Agreement and Strategic Agreement
The large Turkish military intervention against the PKK in 1997 showed that the Iraqi
Kurdish conflict would destroy the Kurdish regional government. Moreover, the US’s effort was
also important in solving the groups’ dispute (Marcus 2007). The PUK and KDP signed the
Washington Agreement in 1998. Both parties agreed to share power within Northern Iraq
(Abdulrahman 2012). This agreement includes equal distribution of revenues from cross trading
with Turkey and other countries and declares the removal of checkpoints, which allow Kurds to

47
move freely throughout the region. Nevertheless, the disagreement “over the composition of a
regional government” continued until 2001. They were able to improve and cooperate on issues
such as “security, demilitarization, the return of displaced people, and other issues” (Freedom
House 2002).
The Washington agreement, Drogheda, guaranteed the security of Turkey, with the KDP
policing the borders, and also constrained the PKK’s ability to mobilize themselves within
Turkish-Iraqi borders. The U.S. government’s involvement is also essential in this agreement
(Olson 1996). With the agreement, the U.S. tried to protect Turkey. It gives us a clear indication
that the PUK and KDP had to take a side with the U.S. in order to establish the Kurdish regional
government (the KRG). Later developments show that KDP members tried to align themselves
with Turkey against the PKK. In 1995, some of them even, for the first time, referred to the
PKK as a terrorist organization on Turkish television. However, some KDP members felt guilty
for fighting against the PKK and their close relationship and collaboration with Turkey has also
been seen as a betrayal of Kurds in Turkey (Olson 1996). The PKK and the KDP decided to sign
a ceasefire in 1995 (Kirisci and Winrow 1997).
The US’s role was essential to establish peace between the PUK and KDP. Moreover,
Iraqi Kurdish interest, which is the survival of the KRG, motivated both groups to sign the
Washington agreement and later the strategic alliance agreement. The US invasion of Iraq also
stopped neighboring countries (Turkey and Iran) from military intervention in Northern Iraq
against the PKK and PJAK. The absence of fear from neighboring countries resulted in a neutral
relationship between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK and PJAK. One reason for the non-cooperation
between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK might be US’s disallowance of cooperation. The US would not
want to upset its relationship with Turkey.
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The Washington agreement created a two-headed government. Sulaymaniyah governed
by the PUK and Erbil and Dohuk ruled by the KDP. However, after the invasion of Iraq, Kurdish
groups decided to transform themselves into a “strategic alliance” in 2005 due to the change in
balance of power in Iraq and in the region7. The competition and conflict between two groups
could have harmed Iraqi Kurds’ interest, which may even result in the risk of losing Erbil, Dohuk
and Sulaymaniyah. The Strategic Alliance was about power sharing in Northern Iraq that
established a one-headed government. The agreement had many great advantages for both
groups such as solving the leadership dispute between Talabani and Barzani, carrying out
Kurdish demands, and increasing the regional activities (Semin 2012). The cooperation between
the PUK and KDP began when both groups perceived the benefit of collaboration to the future of
Iraqi Kurds. However, they also feared that if they did not cooperate, they would risk losing
regional independence. Therefore, both groups saw the opportunity to benefit from cooperation
and feared losing their territorial control, a perceived benefit and fear that formed the
foundations for group cooperation.
When the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured in 1999, many PKK fighters
established their presence in Northern Iraq. Turkey used military intervention in order to capture
PKK members during 2001. Both the PUK and KDP established a unified policy to expel the
PKK members from Northern Iraq (Freedom House 2002). Military interventions likely
7

The principles of the strategic alliance:

“1. Both of the parties will participate in the elections with a unified list, either nationally or provincially.
2. As part of the agreement, the assignment of duties in the KRG will be shared by the two parties (KDP-PUK) and both parties will support each
others’ members in not only Erbil but also Baghdad. Moreover, the PUK and KDP parties will share power in the cabinet for four years, with
each party holding the prime ministerial position and controlling the cabinet for two years each. Under exceptional circumstances, this two-year
period can be extended to four years only if the two parties agree on an extension. For instance, northern Iraq’s President Nechirvan Barzani
continued governing after his term ended upon the request of PUK leader Jelal Talabani”(Semin 2012).
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convinced Iraqi Kurds to act together against the PKK to avoid military interventions in their
region.
6.2.1.5 Relationship between Kurdish Groups after Invasion of Iraq
Table 4 Relationship between Turkey, the U.S. and the PKK, KDP, and PUK
(2003-2007)

TURKEY

The U.S.

The PKK

Unhappy

Neutral

The KDP

Unhappy

Happy

The PUK

Unhappy

Happy

The U.S. invasion of Iraq changed the lives of Iraqi Kurds. At first, Iraqi Kurds were very
nervous about the U.S. invasion of Iraq because they worried that their autonomy might be at
risk and feared that the U.S. would abandon them. On the other hand, the U.S. needed both
Turkey and Iraqi Kurds on their side. Nevertheless, Kurdish and Turkish interests remained in
conflict. Iraqi Kurds did not want the Turkish army in Northern Iraq and they stated that they
would resist if should the Turks invade the territory. The U.S. also needed to reassure Turkey of
a unified Iraq. However, the U.S. failed in this endeavor, which led the Turkish government to
reject U.S. military use of Turkish territory for operations during the Iraq war (Park 2003). In
2003, the relationship between the two countries deteriorated when the U.S. arrested 11 Turkish
military personnel while operating in Northern Iraq. Turkish people viewed this as a source of
humiliation (Gillis 2004). The relationship has taken different shape since 2006.
In 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul signed a
Shared Vision Statement to highlight the common values and goals between the two countries
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(U.S. Department of State 2011). In 2007, Turkish forces moved to the northern Iraqi border,
which alarmed Barzani, who warned that Iraqi Kurds would also carry out attacks in Turkey8.
The Turkish government instigated a major incursion into the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.
The U.S. government stepped in and agreed to establish a location to share intelligence on the
PKK’s whereabouts. Turkey agreed “to limit its intervention to air strikes and brief incursions”
(Katzman 2009, 10). In June 2007, Turkey shelling against the PKK demolished some villages in
the Governorate of Erbil (Governorate Assessment Report Erbil Governorate 2007). Turkey
continued bombing the border areas between 2008 and 2009 (UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers 2009). This demonstrates
that Turkey’s interventions into the Kurdish region have been a great threat to Iraqi Kurds. The
U.S. plays an important role, which tries to find a balance between the two without harming U.S.
interest in Iraq and without upsetting Iraqi Kurds and their relationship with Turkey.
During and after invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds significantly helped the U.S. The U.S.
government used Kurdish military and political forces to stabilize Iraq. In return, the U.S.
removed UN sanctions and any internal or external embargo against the Kurdish region. In 2005,
the Iraqi constitution gave “the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) recognition, rights, and
revenues as a distinct political entity” (Natali 2010, 80). The U.S has supported the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) due to the need for Iraqi Kurds to stabilize Iraq, however their
policies have been influenced by the Turkish fear of an increase in PKK insurgencies within
Turkey. The KRG needs U.S. support for its survival; therefore, they try to avoid any action
against U.S. interest in the region.
8

Before invasion of Iraq, In August of 2000, Turkish air forces bombed the region between Lolan and Xakurk the primary
location of PKK camps (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). Nevertheless, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the military interventions
stopped (until 2007) because Turkey was forcing the KRG to take action against the PKK and persuade the U.S. to defeat the
PKK.
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In 2007, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdogan, visited U.S. President George W. Bush in
the white house. Bush agreed to help Turkey against the PKK, which he viewed as a “common
enemy” of Turkey, the U.S., and Iraq. Both countries agreed to act together against the PKK. In
the proposed relationship, the U.S. would share operational intelligence as well as help Turkey to
capture PKK leaders, research the PKK camps, and cease its logistic support to the PKK (Turkey
and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008). Bush restated his commitment during Turkish
President Gul’s visit in 2008. Since then Turkey has allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik Air base for
the transport of non-lethal cargo to Iraq (U.S. Department of State 2011). Their differences over
the Iraq war brought relations between Turkey and the U.S to one of the lowest points in decades
(Gillis 2004). President Barack Obama’s historical visit to Turkey in 2009 was the first bilateral
visit of his presidency. He highlighted that the U.S.-Turkish relationship is based on mutual
interests and mutual respect. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has also prioritized the U.S.Turkey relationship, and included a stop in Turkey on her first European trip (U.S. Department
of State 2011). In 2009, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Iraq to form a positive
relation with the Iraqi government and the KRG. He insisted that the KRG “take a clear position”
against the PKK. The Prime Minister of the KRG, Nechirvan Barzani, restated that they would
not permit the PKK to use their territory and added that the Turkish Government should provide
general amnesty for PKK members (UNHCR Eligibility Guideliness for Assessing the
International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers 2009, 94). The recent visit to Turkey, in
December 2011, of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, gives us better understanding of the U.S.
Turkish relationship. In their meeting, President Gul told Biden that if the PKK does not stop its
attacks then Turkey will have large intervention to Northern Iraq. In so declaring, Gul clearly
threatens not just the PKK but also the Kurdish Regional Government if they don’t block or
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narrow the field of activities of the PKK in Northern Iraq. Biden also agreed to increase controls
on various measures in Northern Iraq to stop PKK activities (Kemal 2011). These affairs clarify
that both the US and Turkey have been forcing the KRG to against the PKK. If Iraqi Kurds do
not stop the PKK attacks then Turkey seems to suggest that they will use military intervention,
effectively undermining the KRG government.
Turkey did not use military interventions against the PKK until 2008 because
interventions could have caused instability in Iraq, which would anger the US. Moreover, the
PUK and KDP did not act against the PKK because they were helping the US troops fight
against insurgencies in Iraq. These events demonstrate that the Iraqi invasion led the PKK to
have more territorial independence, which caused Turkey to restrain actions against the PKK
(Shifrinso 2006). Nevertheless, after the relationship between the US and Turkey improved, both
parties agreed to act together against the PKK. In order to pressure the KRG to act on Turkey’s
behalf against the PKK, in January 2008, Turkey used four more air strikes against them (Turkey
and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008). One month later, Turkey carried out its 25th
operation in Northern Iraq, deploying 3 thousand Turkish commandos along with other military
backing. However, the U.S. reaction led Turkish forces to withdraw from Northern Iraq (Yirmi
Altinci Operasyon 2011). In August 2011, Turkish planes killed seven Iraqi civilians, however
they denied the accusation (Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan 2011). In
October 2011, Turkey performed its 26th operation. 10 thousand soldiers and air forces operated
in five different places in Northern Iraq: Avasin- Basyan (8 km further from Turkish territory),
Zap (13 km) and Xakurk (17 km) (Yirmi Altinci Operasyon 2011). In November 2011, the U.S.
installed Predator drones from Iraqi to Turkey in order to support anti-PKK actions. The U.S.
government also decided to sell three AH-1 Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey (Iran/Turkey:
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Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan 2011). Iraqi Kurds still do not have much choice but to
cooperate with the Turkish government in order to stop Turkish military interventions in their
region.
Since the invasion of Iraq, Turkey has increased trading with the KRG. The average trade
volume is about $ 5 billion per year. Around $ 1.5 billion to $ 2.6 billion of trade is on
construction and contracting services (Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008,
Bhadrakumar 2007, Natali 2010). Energy cooperation with Northern Iraq also is growing. Iraqi
government allowed the KRD to administer its oil wealth. Business interests in Northern Iraq
have also increased with this new change. Turkish businessmen have been forcing Prime
Minister Erdogan to have direct talks with the KRG. Turkish businesses are making an
investment close to $15 billion in the next period (Bhadrakumar 2007). About 80 percent of
goods sold in Northern Iraq that has bought from Turkey, which reveals that Iraq mostly imports
from Turkey. Some argue that around 55% of the foreign companies in the KRG are from
Turkey, primarily comprising road construction, two airports, a policy department, and general
construction works. The military incursion in 2007 decreased the number of Turkish companies
in northern Iraq from 142 to 52 in 2008 (Fielding-Smith 2010). Nevertheless, this did not stop
future investment in the region. Indeed, in 2009, around 250 Turkish companies were active in
Erbil. In Sulaymaniyah, 500 current companies are Turkish and Iranian. Turkish companies have
the largest investment in the construction market, controlling almost 95 percent. Turkey also
imports the majority of food and consumer items. The KRG also depended on Turkey’s help for
additional electricity demands (Natali 2010).
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Table 5 Turkey’s Exports to Iraq by Sectors (2010)
Turkey's Exports to Iraq

2010

USD %

Iron and Steel

712,130,03211

.8%

Electrical Mach. Appar.

508,474,5308.

4%

Cereals, Cereal Preprtns.

501,278,2498.

3%

Non-Metal. Mineral Manfct.

425,350,2897.

0%

Metals Manufactures

370,272,8676.

1%

Vegetables and Fruit

337,005,6995.

6%

Miscalenaus manufactured
products
Furniture, Bedding, etc.

248,618,2304.

1%

206,854,6983.

4%

General Industl. Mach.

183,189,6853.

0%

Paper, Paperboard, etc.

173,884,4352.

9%

Clothing and Accessories

173,362,3582.

9%

Textile Yarn, Fabric, etc.

173,206,2492.

9%

Dairy Products, Bird Eggs

155,568,1802.

6%

Essentl. Oils, Perfume, etc.

145,175,8072.

4%

Plastic, Non-Primary Form

135,355,2122.

2%

Meat and Meat Preparation

135,153,6022.

2%

Road Vehicles

121,546,1132.

0%

Petroleum, Petr. Products

128,782,0782.

1%

Special. Indust. Machinery

114,807,2611.

9%

Electricity

99,724,0361.

7%

TOTAL (2010)

6,042,549,876
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Note: Adopted from Tepav (Turkiye Economi Politikalari Arastirma Vakfi) 2011.
From the table we can see that trading with Turkey has played an important role in the
socioeconomic life of the KRG. This rapid development and change will likely continue in the
future (Kalkan 2011).
Since Turkey has been seen as a rising power and influential country in the region it is
becoming a more important ally for the U.S. Making it therefore vital for the U.S. to strengthen
the relationship (Gillis 2004). The high number of interventions in Northern Iraq suggests that
Turkey is a constant external threat to Kurdish cooperation because the Northern Iraqi
government is afraid to cooperate and support the PKK out of fear of Turkey’s violent behavior.
In some operations Iraqi Kurds have even cooperated with the Turkish government to stop
Turkish interventions in their region. For that reason, the U.S. and Iraqi Kurds are providing all
possible help and support to Turkey against the PKK. Moreover, the KRG developed multimillion dollar cross-regional trading with neighboring countries, especially with Turkey,
resulting in interdependence between these countries. Turkey and Iran also are also extremely
important for the landlocked Kurdish region. Either closing these borders or involving itself in
cross-border military intervention can cause large financial losses to the KRG. Therefore, the
KRG has changed its policies toward the PKK and PJAK and - to maintain a good relationship
with Turkey and Iran - they may do more in the future to also guarantee a possible trade zone for
international businesses, export and import goods, and gain from possible pipeline revenues
(Natali 2010, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008).
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6.2.1.6 Relationship between Turkish Government and the KRG
After the invasion of Iraq, Turkey believed that aggressive policies toward the KRG
would prevent them from protecting the PKK. In order to ensure that ability, they isolated the
KRG diplomatically and economically, effectively maintaining a weak KRG. However, the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) employed a different approach during their still-existing
10 years of governance. They believe that in order to prevent the PKK attacks they should
persuade the KRG to ensure that Turkey has stronger political, diplomatic and economical ties
with the KRG. In 2007 and 2008, Turkey used “a carrot and stick” approach to force the KRG to
work against the PKK. Turkey threatened the KRG with an economic embargo and military
intervention in Northern Iraq if they continued protecting and sheltering the PKK. In contrast,
Turkey has promised the KRG diplomatic, political and economical relations if they cooperate in
the counter-PKK operation (Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008).
In 2008, the withdrawal of Turkish troops warmed the relationship. Nechirvan Barzani,
the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), endorsed the Turkish action.
He stated that military actions block the dialogue between the PKK and Turkey. He emphasized
diplomatic solutions. The Prime Minister of Iraq, Barzani, also stated that before the Turkish
intervention, both the Iraqi government and the KRG tried different methods to constrain PKK
actions (Prime Minister Barzani commends Turkey's troop withdrawal 2008).
The first high-level talks with Turkey did not start until May 2008. The talk was between
the KRG Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani, “…and senior advisor to Turkish Prime Minister,
Murat Özçelik, the Special Coordinator for Iraqi Affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry; and
Derya Kanbay, Turkey's Ambassador in Baghdad” (KRG Statement on first High-level Talks
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with Turkey 2008, 1). The meeting was about security, and political and economical issues
between the Turkish Government, and the KRG. Nechirvan Barzani highlights that the KRG
understands Turkey’s concerns and states that the problems can be solved through political
dialogue (KRG Statement on first High-level Talks with Turkey 2008).
In April 2008, Foreign Minister of Turkey stated that they are ready to have a dialogue
with the KRG, which had called for talks for some time. The KRG’s Head of Foreign Relations
declared their satisfaction that Turkey desires to cooperate and talk with the KRG. This dialogue
will solve the concerns that military action is not the solution to create a stable border (KRG
welcomes talks with Turkey 2008). In 2009, Barzani also praised Turkey’s attempts to have a
dialogue with Kurds in his interview with CNN. He also emphasized that the KRG never
supported violent actions and that dialogue is the only option. Furthermore, Barzani stated that
the relationship between the KRG and Turkey should not be bound to the PKK’s violence. Iraqi
Kurds are not responsible for the violent actions of the group. He lastly stated that a solution to
the problem would be a positive outcome (President Barzani praises Turkey's Efforts to engage
with Kurds 2009). This indicates that the KRG and Kurdish leaders wanted to reach a peaceful
solution and that they both stressed that military interventions are not a viable option. Both the
KRG and Kurdish leaders also highlight that they do not support or help the PKK’s violent
actions. Moreover, these statements reveal that the KRG is eager to develop a close relationship
with Turkey.
When the PKK extended the ceasefire with Turkey, the Prime Minister of the KRG was
pleased and believed that the ceasefire would bring stability and peace to the region (Prime
Minister Barzani welcomes Extension of PKK Ceasefire 2009). The first historical visit comes
with the Turkish foreign minister’s visit to the KRG on October 2009. President Barzani
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declared that Turkey is an important country for Iraq’s development. Later, Turkey announced
that they will open a Consulate General in Erbil, the KRG capitol. During the visit, Turkey
signed 48 agreements of cooperation with the Iraqi government. The Turkish foreign minister
stated that these agreements also pertain to the KRG (President Barzani, Turkey's Foreign
Minister Davutoğlu hold historic meetings, announce plans to open consulate 2009). This is an
important development for the KRG because Turkey’s decision to open a Turkish Consulate
General demonstrates that is Turkey willing to have a closer relationship with the KRG.
Moreover, Turkey is aware of the potential of Northern Iraq to “…serve as a gateway to Iraq”
and Iraq and Iraqi Kurds concurrently see Turkey as a gateway to west. However, some started to
wonder if Turkey would continue referring the KRG as “northern Iraq” or if they would formally
recognize the KRG. The KRG's head of foreign relations stated “the KRG do not make the issue
of the name 'Kurdistan' a problem. The essence is more important than the name. The opening of
the consulate shows how far we have come” (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2010, 1). Obviously, the KRG
is trying to develop a close relationship with Turkey and Kurdish officials believe that Turkey
will eventually officially accept the KRG.
Another historical event came in the form of president Barzani’s visit with Prime
Minister Erdogan, the Foreign Minister, and the Minister of the Interior of Turkey. All of the
officials were pleased with the visit, believing that it will build broader relations for the coming
years. During the meeting, economic issues and democratic opening of Turkey were discussed
(President Barzani Wraps up Historic Trip to Turkey 2010). A further achievement was a
Turkey-Kurdistan Region Economic Forum. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Trade and over
two-hundred Turkish business agents also attended. Both governments agreed to begin a free
trade zone, opening Turkish banks and permitting Turkish airlines to fly to KRG’s capitol, Erbil
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(Turkey’s Foreign Trade Minister participates in Erbil Economic Forum 2010). These are also
huge steps for KRG economical development.
Other small meetings involved the Turkish Interior Minister in 2010 and the
Undersecretary of Foreign Ministry of Turkey in 2011. The first meeting focused on security
conditions along the border areas. The second meeting revolved around economical and political
issues (Turkey’s Interior Minister discusses security with President and Prime Minister in Erbil
2010 and Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary meets President Barzani and PM Salih 2011).
These and other meetings demonstrate that economical and security issues are the two important
factors determining the relationship between Turkey and the KRG.
But the most important visit happened in 2011 when Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan visited the Kurdish Region. He is the first Turkish premier to visit the KRG. During his
visit he opened the Erbil International Airport and the Turkish Consulate in Erbil. These are also
two essential steps for the economical and political relationship. The KRG’s Head of Foreign
Relations stated “With this historic visit, we are entering a new phase in our relations with
Turkey. We are optimistic because it paves the way for greater cooperation between Turkey and
the Kurdistan Region as well as all of Iraq” (President Barzani and Prime Minister Erdogan open
Erbil International Airport and Turkish Consulate 2011). These statements summarize how the
relationship and cooperation between governments is becoming very significant.
After the PKK attack in October 2011, which killed 24 Turkish soldiers, Barzani
condemned the attack and stated “this action is first and foremost against the interests of the
people of Kurdistan” and claimed that it targets the Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood (Hedefi TürkKürt Kardeşliği 2011 and Kurdistan Region Presidency Strongly Condemns Violent Attack in
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Turkey 2011). After the attack, the KRG decided to evacuate the villages near the border to
avoid civilian harm (Hedefi Türk-Kürt Kardeşliği 2011). In November 2011, Barzani visited
Turkey. The reason for the visit was security. Barzani declared that Turkish and KRG security
depend upon one another. During the meeting, they discussed the status of the Turkish troops
stationed in Iraq since 1996. Barzani agreed to allow the Turkish government to stay in Northern
Iraq for six years more. With the strategic locations of the PKK, the Hakurk, Zap, and Qandil
Mountain, Turkey wanted to establish a new base in order to prevent attacks. Barzani seems to
have agreed that Turkey could open a new base. Nevertheless, Barzani emphasized that the
military operations are not solutions and he offered the Turkish officials help to resume the
negotiation dialogues between the PKK and the government (Asker Alti Yil daha Kuzey Iraq’ta
2011).
Turkish side was not satisfied with the Northern Iraqi government’s response. Prime
Minister Erdogan stated that if Northern Iraq does not take actions against the PKK that Turkish
armed forces will take action against the PKK. This is an open warning to Northern Iraq.
However, the KRG do not want to fight against their follow Kurds. Barzani also believes in
applying political instead of military pressure on the PKK to reach a solution (Bayram sonrasi:
Sinir otesi mi Ateskes mi? 2011). Turkey seems to be pressuring the KRG to fight against the
PKK. However, Barzani and the KRG also explicitly refuse military actions against the PKK.
Recently, Barzani claims that they are forcing the PKK to cease its military actions and solve the
problems through democratic means (Askin 2011). Talabani also declares that they persuaded
the PKK but that the Turkish side only half-agreed with the terms that the PKK has been
demanding (Silah Birakmasi icin PKK’yi ikna ettik 2011). It seems that Kurdish officials are
playing the role of mediator between the PKK and the Turkish Government.
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Barzani’s visit to the White House and Turkey in April 2012 proved pivotal. Politicians
in both meetings welcomed Barzani as a state leader. He stated that Iraqi Kurds seek peaceful
solutions to the issues between the Turkish government and the PKK, reinforcing that violent
means were useless and dangerous. If both sides arrive at peaceful methods then the KRG will
help the process in any means. If the PKK insist on using guns then they (the PKK) will face the
consequences. Barzani’s most important remark was that the KRG will not allow the PKK to
obtain their presence and use the KRG to attack Turkey. In so doing, Barzani for the first time
indicated that they would not tolerate the PKK’s presence in their territory. He added that they
still would not support or join any military operations against the PKK because he believes that
military operations will not end the PKK (Ertan 2012, Yetkin 2012). Following both meetings,
he revealed further insight into the fact that these issues were the focus of both meetings held in
Ankara and Washington (Yetkin 2012). These events and remarks illustrate that Barzani is taking
a harder stance against the PKK. One reason for his tougher position is the U.S. government.
Iraqi Kurds are willing to obtain their independence and they are aware that the U.S.’s role is
crucial for their goal. In order to earn U.S. support, they support the U.S. foreign position
against the PKK and Turkey. Thus, great powers can convince groups to either cooperate or not
cooperate with their co-ethnic groups. Moreover, Iraqi Kurdish groups’ gains are greater if they
obtain international support for their survival or group(s) goals.
Journalist Hasan Cemal’s interviews with Barzani and Talabani in the 1990s reveal that
Iraqi Kurdish position is not new. He states that from the 1990s through 2000, both Barzani and
Talabani slammed the PKK and Turkey. However, they stated privately that there are limits to
what can be done against the PKK and they added that Turkey needs to apply democratic
reforms (Cemal 2012). As we see, the Iraqi Kurdish position did not change after the U.S.
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invasion of Iraq. Turkey used aggressive policies toward the KRG, which will force them to
cease protection of the PKK. Nevertheless, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) decided to
take a different approach. They believe in order to prevent the PKK attacks they should persuade
the KRG to ensure that Turkey should have stronger political, diplomatic and economical ties
with the KRG. Turkey threatened the KRG with economic embargo and military intervention in
Northern Iraq if they continue protecting and sheltering the PKK. The KRG supports Turkey in
order to establish diplomatic, political and economical relations with Turkey. However, Iraqi
officials and the KRG clearly refuse military actions against the PKK, instead forcing the PKK to
stop its military actions and solve problems through democratic means. One reason for their
refusal is that in the 1990s fighting against their Kurdish brother had left a sour taste; therefore,
they do not want to repeat the same mistake. It seems that Kurdish officials are playing the role
of mediator between the PKK and the Turkish Government. This reveals that past experiences,
in this case negative, resulted in a positive outcome for the groups’ relationships. Co-ethnic
groups do not wish to repeat the same mistake twice. Examination of Iranian Kurdish interaction
with other Kurdish groups also reveals some variation, which leads to my last analysis.
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6.3 Iranian Kurds
6.3.1 The KDPI and PJAK
Table 6 The KDPI and PJAK relationship with Iraqi Kurds and the PKK
The KDP

The PUK

The PKK

The KDPI

Bad (1980-1999)

Good (1980-1999)

Neutral (1980-1999)

The PJAK

Bad (2005-2012)

Bad (2005-2012)

Good (1999-2012)

The KDPI was the largest Iranian Kurdish opposition group demanding autonomy for
Iranian Kurds. The KDPI also used the Iraqi territory to launch attacks against the Islamic
government (Gunter 2003). Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 gave leverage to Iraqi Kurds
(especially the KDP) to form a good relationship with the Iranian government. Nevertheless, The
PUK allied itself with the Iranian Kurdish KDPI, as they shared leftist ideologies (Marcus 2007).
The armed struggle in Iraq also influenced and helped the resurgence of the KDPI in Iran. The
Iranian government used Barzani’s influence over the KDPI which led Barzani to claim that
Kurds in Iran should wait until the Iraqi KDP achieved its own autonomy. Tehran’s support of
Barzani led him to discourage the Kurdish push to end anti-Iranian activism in Iran. Some
listened to Barzani while others continued armed struggle. However, Iranian armed forces
defeated the KDPI’s struggle with the help of Barzani, who closed the borders and led many
Iranian Kurds to die (Hassanpour, 1994). There were minor conflicts between the KDP and
KDPI. In one, Barzani helped Iran drive out KDPI members from strategic positions (Bruinessen
1986). Barzani even returned KDPI members to the Iranian government (Gunter 2003). Some
KDPI members stayed in Europe and Iraq until the end of the Pahlavi monarchy. Barzani did not
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help Iranian Kurds due to financial support from the Iranian government (Hassanpour, 1994).
This demonstrates that Barzani performed a cost benefit analysis influenced by the Iranian
government, which impacted his decision. He therefore decided to align his organization (the
KDP) with Iran due to financial support from Iran (Ahmed and Gunter 2007).
There were also conflicts between the KDPI and Komala due to disagreement over
control of certain districts in 1984 (Bruinessen 1986). For a few years, both sides lost significant
power. The KDPI disbanded and weakened after the assignation of two leaders. The Komala
basically became the only alternative to the KDPI. Nevertheless, the Komala also failed because
it could not devote itself to either the national struggle or to the revolution. Both the KDPI and
Komala established their political parties in Iran, demanding the independence of Iranian Kurds
(Hassanpour 1994). The representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in
Britain, Loghman Ahmedi, states that the KDPI does not completely refuse violent actions unless
it is in the interest of Iranian Kurds. Nevertheless, he adds that there are different methods and
strategies available that will not result in the loss of human lives. He also states that one reason
for their peaceful political struggle is that they do not want Iran to attack the KRG. The KRG’s
security is extremely important for the KDPI. Ahmedi claims that the KDPI try to maintain a
positive relationship with all Kurdish organizations, including the PKK. Nevertheless, they do
not want any Kurdish party to dictate what action they must take. He states that they regularly
meet with “Komala and other Kurdish Parties, however [they] do not have any relationship with
PJAK” (Wilgenburg 2009). They try to distinguish and detach their party from PJAK because
they want to avoid angering the Iranian government, thereby avoiding military actions against
their party too.
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The relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Iranian Kurds was influenced by group
economic interest. Barzani did not want to damage the relationship with the Iranian government
and did not want to lose Tehran’s financial support for its struggle. Fears of economic losses
motivated Barzani to act against the KDPI. However, it seems the relationship has changed
between Iraqi Kurds and the KDPI since the KDPI transformed itself into a political party. One
of the KDPI’s objectives is to protect the KRG from military attacks. This demonstrates that
ethnic ties play an important role for groups to avoid any action that would harm their co-ethnic
groups. Nevertheless, the KDPI or other Iranian Kurdish political parties do not want to have any
association with PJAK because they all fear the Iranian government. In this case, the threat from
the host state (Iran) is the essential cause preventing Iranian Kurdish groups’ cooperation.
6.3.2 The PJAK and Cooperation with Other Co-ethnic Kurdish Groups
The PKK also did not want to involve itself with Iranian Kurds because of Iranian
support to the PKK. Nevertheless, when Ocalan was captured in 1999 Iran ceased its financial
aid. This changed the relationship between the PKK and Iranian Kurds. The PKK tried to earn
Iranian Kurdish support and they succeeded in gaining the attention of some Iranian Kurds who
were fed up with the Iranian regime (Marcus 2007). Iran and Turkey claimed that the PJAK, a
“moderate wing of the PKK”, was established and based in the Qandil Mountains in Northern
Iraq (Ahmed and Gunter 2007, and Marcus 2007). However, PJAK and the PKK use different
sides of Qandil because of different military strategies (Timmerman 2007). Since 2005, PJAK
has settled the PKK-based slopes of Mount Qandil. For that reason, they are controlled by the
PKK. PJAK member, Rahman Ahmedi, states “the PKK does not need us. They have tens of
thousands of fighters, and hundreds of thousands of sympathizers”. He admits “the PKK and
PJAK cooperate to a certain degree if only to prevent clashes between their own fighters”
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(Timmerman 2007). Ahmedi wants to distance PJAK from the PKK because Turkey forced the
U.S. to admit that PJAK was allied with the PKK. Association with the PKK decreases PJAK’s
credibility. Nevertheless, PJAK is thusly influenced by the PKK’s ideologies and Ocalan’s
military strategies. This demonstrates that both Turkish and Iranian Kurds have close ties and
that their relationship is cooperative. However, PJAK does not demand for an independent
Kurdish state, but instead seek to replace the Iranian regime with a democratic rule. They also
support the idea of self-rule for all groups in Iran (Brandon 2006). PJAK and the PKK have a
close relationship compared to other Iraqi or Irani Kurdish groups, a relationship founded upon
their similar ideologies and military strategies. However, the biggest reason for the PKK to allow
and help PJAK against Iran is the PKK’s lack of fear of losing economic gains from Iran.
Cooperating with PJAK allowed the PKK to use, direct, and control PJAK members for certain
ends. In this case, cooperation is more advantageous than non-cooperation.
The PKK’s activities and Iranian and Turkish government use of military interventions in
Northern Iraq in order to stop PJAK and has been a great concern for Iraqi Kurds. The KRG did
not want to damage the relationship with these countries because with them they have close
economical ties. The KRG constantly ask both groups to lay down the arms struggle and to
peacefully resolve their issues. (Marcus 2007). In 2008, the PKK and PJAK (Iranian violent
Kurdish group) increased violent activity, causing the short-term closing of the Turkish and
Iranian border and airspace. This event severely impacted the KRG’s economy, costing the
Kurdish government around US $1 billion daily. The KRG countered and began closing PKK
offices in the cities, blocking the routes to the Qandil Mountains (the base for the PKK camps),
and campaigning against PKK actions. Sulaymaniyah officials also promised the Iranian
government to take necessary actions against PJAK if they opened the borders again (Natali
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2010). According to Natali (2010), in Sulaymaniyah, where Iran and the KRG “share three
official and two unofficial border points…”, “…over half of 500 foreign companies… are
Turkish and Iranian” (93-94). The KRG established a free-trade-zone with Iran, from whom they
receive most of their electricity. In 2007, 60 percent of trade merchants in Sulaymaniyah
received $1 billion worth of goods from Iran. More than 120 Iranian companies are established
in the KRG and about 80 percent of these companies work in trading, food and housing in
Sulaymaniyah. Iranian service providers built the Azman Tunnel in Sulaymaniyah, which aids
Iran in the exportation of many construction materials, such as plastic, cement, and polyvinyl
chloride, into Sulaymaniyah, (Natali 2010). This convinced the KRG to strategically cooperate
with neighboring countries to guarantee “international recognition and open borders” (122). This
shows that Turkey and Iran use the economical dependency of the KRG as leverage and, in some
cases, as a threat to pressure Iraqi Kurds to act against the PKK and PJAK. The KRG will lose a
great deal if they help their fellow Kurds. They find themselves in a position in which they do
not want to bear the cost because there is only minimal gain (by helping co-ethnic groups) in
return. The government of Sulaymaniyah guaranteed the Iranian government control of PJAK
activities if they reopen borders (Natali 2010). In January 2011, the Prime Minister of the KRG,
Barham Salih, visited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the Speaker of the Parliament,
the Industry Minister, the Head of the National Security Council, and the foreign minister of
Iran. The reason for his visit was to improve commercial relations and to increase growth in
Sulaymaniyah (Prime Minister Salih meets Iran's President in official visit to Tehran 2011). This
incident reveals that Iraqi Kurds economical development is essential to Iraqi Kurds and that
neighboring countries play an important part. Therefore, they encourage the Iranian government
to invest more to their region.
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The biggest fear and most damaging development for Iraqi Kurds have been military
attacks in their region. In 2006, the Iranian government oppressed Kurds, causing Kurdish
counterattacks. The killing of 10 Kurdish demonstrators led PJAK to respond with “three attacks
against two Iranian bases”. Iran also responded with military operations near Mount Qandil, by
crossing five kilometers into Iraq. They also bombed PKK locations. The director of the joint
operation center at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense claimed that it was a mistake to have attacked
the PKK instead of PJAK. Since then, the European Union and the US has recognized the PKK
as a “terrorist organization”. The close ties between PJAK and the PKK prevented the US and
the KRG from stopping Iranian military interventions into their territory (Brandon 2006).
In August and September 2007, Iran used shelling against the PJAK, demolishing homes,
villages and livestock in the Governorate of Erbil. Due to the heavy shelling, in September, 850
families had to leave the areas (Governorate Assessment Report Erbil Governorate 2007). In
2009, Iran bombed Northern Iraq, an action strongly condemned by the KRG government
(Statement: KRG strongly condemns bombardment of border areas by Islamic Republic of Iran
2009). In July 2011, Iran attacked PJAK. Turkey also used intense air fire and prepared for
military intervention, which suggests that Iran and Turkey are cooperating to stop PKK and
PJAK activities (Cavdar 2011). On July 13, 2011, reportedly 10,000 Iranian forces crossed the
border and forced Iraqi Kurds to leave their homes and villages (Iraqi Kurds accuse Iran of
illegal border crossing, 10,000 revolutionary guards cross the Iraqi border: Al-Rafedain
TV 2011). In the beginning of July, Barzani condemned the attacks against Iran and stated that
the attacks do not justify Iranian military attacks against the KRG, which impacts Irani and KRG
relations. He states that the recent bombing of Iran was 76 km from the capital of Erbil and adds
"instead of instilling fear, they (the Iranians) would do better to try to resolve the issue through
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dialogue and find workable solutions" (Iraqi Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani warns Iran
over shelling 2011, 1). Barzani’s statement proves that Iran clearly threatens Iraqi Kurds and
forces them to take actions against PJAK.
On July 27, 2011, the KRG decided to position 12,000 peshmarga along the Iranian
border, where Iran launched heavy attacks against PJAK and Iraqi Kurdish civilians. Salah
Dilmani, a high-ranking Peshmarga officer stated, “we will confront any forces that may attempt
to cross the borders of Kurdistan” (Iraqi Kurdistan deploys 12,000 Kurdish troops along the Iran
border 2011). However, there have not been any clashes between Iraqi Kurds and any other
Kurdish groups. Dilmani adds that Ansar al-Islam fighters (a militant Islamic Kurdish group)
support and help Iranian forces (Iraqi Kurdistan deploys 12,000 Kurdish troops along the Iran
border 2011). During this time, the British, U.S., and Iraqi governments ordered Iran and Turkey
to end military actions against the KRG and respect Iraqi territorial sovereignty. They also
advised the KRG to solve the dispute through dialogue (British parliamentarians voice concern
about Iranian and Turkish bombardment of Kurdistan border 2011, Iraq says Iran’s shelling of
Kurdish PJAK rebels damages ties 2011, and Iraqi Kurdistan deploys 12,000 Kurdish troops
along the Iran border 2011). It is obvious that the international community is unhappy with
military interventions, nonetheless they do not take actions to stop it. Moreover, ideological
similarities (the case of Ansar al-Islam) play an important role in a group’s difficult decision to
ally itself with a host state hostile to their co-ethnic groups. In other words, ideological
similarities can be, sometimes, more important than ethnic ties for ethnic groups. Furthermore,
military threat from neighboring countries forces groups to take protective actions to stop it.
Nevertheless, this might be used strategically to prevent military interventions in their region
because Iraqi Kurds did not stop nor fight with any group or country. This illustrates that greater
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military threat sometimes motivates groups to avoid military intervention not just through
dialogue, but also through demonstrations of military strength.
Between July and November 2011, 1,350 families (8,000 individuals) had to relocate,
dozens of homes were damaged, and ten villages were either fully or partially destroyed due to
military attracts and shelling from Iran and Turkey. Mula Issa, a displaced resident, affirmed,
“The PKK fighters do not use our villages. We thought before that Turkey was trying to make us
all leave so they can have their war with the PKK anywhere they want. But after the most recent
bombings [since early October], which have actually hit our houses, we feel they are now
attacking us” (Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan 2011, 1). Iranian soldiers
would also attack farmers and kill their livestock, as observed and reported by Human Rights
Watch in 2010-2011(Iraqi Kurdistan: Cross-Border Attacks Should Spare Iraqi Civilians 2011). In July
2011, Iraq's Foreign Minister Hoshyar stated that Iran has been shelling Northern Iraq for over
five years (Iraq says Iran shelling of Kurdish PJAK rebels damages ties 2011). According to the
Middle East director of Human Rights Watch, Sarah Leah Whitson, “Iran may say it is
responding to armed attacks from Iraqi Kurdistan, but its own attacks, including indiscriminate
use of rockets near civilian villages, are causing grave harm to civilians” (Iran/Turkey: Recent
Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan 2011, 1). Since September 2011, a ceasefire between Iran and
PJAK has decreased Iranian attacks against the KRG (Iran/Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi
Kurdistan 2011). All these events show that the military threat is immense. Iraqi Kurds have
already been harmed by military operations, therefore it is unthinkable for Iraqi Kurds to help
their co-ethnic groups. They are aware that that would only increase the military threat and that
this time they would face a military confrontation with neighboring countries.
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Iraqi Kurds use dialogue and political means to solve issues with Iran and Turkey. In
September 2011, Barzani stated that they are in a difficult position because Iran and Turkey are
calling them to control the borders in order to avoid any problem. Nevertheless, “we are afraid to
send forces to the borders for fear of a Kurdish-Kurdish war" and he adds “the PKK and the
PJAK are not taking the situation in the Kurdish region into consideration… I call on the two
sides to abandon the idea of achieving their rights via military means.” (Barzani calls on PKK,
PJAK to end attacks from Iraqi soil, 2011, 1). Ethnic ties between Kurdish groups discourage
Iraqi Kurds to fight against their fellow Kurds from other regions. Moreover, the past experience
of Kurdish civil war between the PKK and Iraqi Kurds left both parties sour. They wish to avoid
any further confrontation with other Kurdish groups. However, they are under constant military
threat from neighboring countries, which persuade against supporting the PKK and PJAK,
instead they seek to convince Kurdish groups to give up their arm struggle.
Iran and the KRG government have attempted to improve their relationship. In October
2011, Barzani had an official visit with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khomeini, President
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, to discuss PJAK
activities in Northern Iraq. The Iranian government therefore also began to display an increased
focus on cooperation on not just security issues, but also on trade and cultural issues (Tol 2012).
Salehi stated “there is a potential for increasing this volume ($ 4 billion) and we hope to be able
to increase the level of exchanges through mutual cooperation” (FM for Further KRG Trade
2011, 1 and President Barzani meets Supreme Leader Khomeini and President Ahmedinejad in
Tehran 2011). The KRG is aware of the importance of a strong economic and military
relationship with Iran.
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My analysis shows that military threat was the main hypothesis explaining the noncooperation between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK and PJAK. As Barzani states, the KRG is in a
difficult situation. Iran and Turkey use military power to overcome their ethnic problems and
have no concern for the lives of Iraqi Kurdish civilians. One reason for their careless actions is to
pressure Iraqi Kurds to avoid any affiliation with the PKK and PJAK. Iranian Kurdish groups
(Komala and KDPI) have also tried to distance themselves from PJAK, so as to avoid
punishment under Iranian law. Secondly, by military interventions to Northern Iraq, they force
the KRG to take military actions against both Kurdish groups.
Economical threat or pressure is the second hypothesis illustrating that the KRG needs its
neighboring countries for its survival. Having a landlocked region enables Iraqi Kurds to act
freely. The cooperation between the PKK and PJAK can be explained through cost and benefit
analysis. The relationship between the two groups improved when Iran withdrew financial
support to the PKK in 1999. Cooperation helped the PKK to hold influence over Iranian Kurds,
which further increased their military advantage. Ideological similarities and ethnic ties between
these two groups also played a crucial role in their cooperation.

7. IN CONCLUSION
In this paper, I tried to address how co-ethnic groups react or respond when a member of
the same ethnic group has an on-going ethnic conflict in a neighboring country. Under which
circumstances do they or do they not cooperate? I examined the causal relationship between
external pressure and non-cooperation through a structured comparative study of Kurdish ethnic
groups, which include the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, the PKK) from
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Turkey, the Kurdish Autonomous region in Iraq, PJAK (the Militant Party for Free of Kurdistan)
from Iran, and Kurds from Syria between 1980-2012.
My first hypothesis stated that groups will cooperate due to their ethnic ties, a hypothesis
that revealed itself to be not as clear-cut as expected. It is generally believed that strong
nationalism and ethnic ties would lead groups to cooperate. There are some examples of
cooperation among Kurds due to their ethnic ties. For example, Syrian and Iranian Kurds were
and are cooperating with the PKK. The cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and their co-ethnic
groups (the PKK, PJAK, the KDPI, and Komala) is also not constant. In the early period,
cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK was present due to ethnic ties. However my study
shows that groups withdraw their support due to external factors. Groups decide to help their coethnic groups if the cost of cooperation is lower, otherwise they will withdraw or tend to not
cooperate in the first place. This suggests that ethnic identities have a great impact on co-ethnic
group cooperation, while also suggesting that ethnic ties do not always guarantee cooperation.
My second hypothesis, that a host state’s relationship with a violent ethnic group impacts
the level of cooperation among co-ethnic groups, revealed some empirical results. The good
relationship between the PKK and the Syrian government convinces or makes it easy for Syrian
Kurds to freely aid and join the PKK. However, when the nature of the relationship changes
between two groups, so does their level of cooperation. In accordance, Syrian Kurds began
receiving greater internal threats (punished under the law) from the Syrian government (due to
their support for their co-ethnic violent group). This means that if a host state supports an ethnic
violent group, then this will likely increase the level of cooperation among the same co-ethnic
groups and ethnic violent group residing in the host state.
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Empirical analysis demonstrates that external threat, especially military threat, is the key
hypothesis explaining non-cooperation among co-ethnic groups. For Syrian Kurds, they did not
have any external or internal threat demanding their non-cooperation with the PKK until 1999. In
fact, they were even encouraged to cooperate by the Syrian government. However, later, military
threat from Turkey forced Syria to take a different position. Syrian Kurds were punished if they
aided the PKK, which decreased the level of cooperation between co-ethnic groups.
The cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and their co-ethnic groups was and is greatly
influenced by external threat. In the early period, cooperation between Iraqi Kurds and the PKK
was present due to ethnic ties. However tactical differences and Turkish military interventions to
Northern Iraq led the groups to dismiss agreements already in place. My study reveals the high
number of interventions (29) in Northern Iraq, suggesting that Turkey is a constant external
threat to Kurdish cooperation, naturally, as the Northern Iraqi government finds itself afraid to
cooperate and support the PKK due to Turkey’s violent behavior. In some operations, Iraqi
Kurds have even cooperated with the Turkish government to stop Turkish interventions in their
region. The Iranian government also constantly bombed PJAK camps and intervened militarily
in Northern Iraq, destroying, either fully or partially, more than ten Kurdish Iraqi villages.
Barzani and Talabani feared non-cooperation with the PKK and PJAK, which would have
increased the military threat and may have even led to a direct military confrontation with
Turkey and Iran.
Economical pressure or threat from neighboring countries also was and is an important
component for non-group cooperation between co-ethnic groups. Iraqi Kurds have depended
economically on neighboring countries (Iran and Turkey) for some time. Cross-border trading is
essential for these groups because they are landlocked. Their survival depends on neighboring
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countries. Due to their geographical isolation, groups strive to avoid conflict with their
neighboring countries, even if it means not supporting their co-ethnic groups during armed
conflict. In this scenario, an ethnic group performs a cost and benefit analysis. If they trade for
great gain then they would prefer to cooperate with these countries rather than supporting violent
ethnic groups. If they support violent ethnic groups, neighboring countries in the midst of an
ongoing armed conflict can use economic dependence as leverage against state and the same
ethnic groups in neighboring countries. The KRG developed multi-million dollar cross-regional
trading with neighboring countries, especially Turkey, which has created interdependency
between the two countries. Either closing these borders or involving itself with cross-border
military intervention can cause large financial losses to the KRG. Turkey and Iran has used
closing borders in the past to pressure the KRG to act against the PKK and PJAK. In order to
maintain a good relationship with Turkey and Iran, the KRD may do more in the future to
guarantee a possible trade zone for international businesses, export and import goods, and gain
from possible pipeline revenues.
Another crucial hypothesis that explains groups’ cooperation is the role of the great
powers. The U.S. was the important external actor influencing cooperation among Kurds and
was the key actor in peace negotiations between the KDP and the PUK in 1998. Nevertheless,
the U.S. has discouraged Iraqi Kurds to cooperate with the PKK because Turkey plays a crucial
role in U.S. policy. Bush and Obama agreed to help Turkey against the PKK, which they viewed
as a “common enemy” of Turkey, the U.S. and Iraq. Both countries agreed to act together against
the PKK. After the creation of a “safe haven” and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the KRG has
required U.S. support for its survival. Therefore, they try to not act against U.S. interest in the
region. Other Kurdish groups, such as PJAK and PKK seem to be less influenced by the U.S.
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government than the KDP and PUK. Nevertheless, in the case of PJAK my study shows that the
leaders and members of PJAK try to distance itself from the PKK to gain legitimacy and
increased support from other countries. This shows that support of a great power is essential for a
group struggle, leading group(s) to collaborate and avoid disturbing their state interest even if
that means non-cooperation with co-ethnic group(s).
The study demonstrates that ideological outlooks have little impact on non-cooperation
among Kurdish groups. Groups do not fight over ideological differences, but similar ideologies
make it easy for groups to cooperate and build good relationships. Ideological similarities helped
Kurdish groups to establish close ties. For example, one reason for a good relationship between
PJAK and the PKK, and the PKK and Syrian Kurds, is similarities in ideology. Syrian and
Iranian Kurds both share or adopted the ideas of Ocalan. This also reveals that when groups
work too closely with a larger and more established group they are more likely to adopt those
ideas, helping to build a strong relation.
Moreover, past experiences between ethnic groups have an impact, be it positive or
negative, and influence ethnic groups’ perceptions of each other. Iraqi Kurds clearly refuse
military actions against the PKK and PJAK, instead forcing them to stop their military actions
and solve problems through democratic means. One reason for their refusal is that in the 1990’s
fighting against their Kurdish brothers left a sour taste; therefore, they do not want to repeat the
same mistake. It seems that Kurdish officials are playing the role of mediator between violent
Kurdish groups and neighboring host countries, Turkey and Iran. The case study shows that
negative past experiences had a positive impact on groups’ attitude for other groups.
Nevertheless, it is hard to claim that this will be the case for all cases.
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Furthermore, my hypothesis, the competition for group leadership or for political and
economical power (if there is more than one group) has also played a role in co-ethnic group
cooperation. The civil war between the PUK and the KDP from 1994-1998 was fought over
economic competition between the groups. Iraqi Kurdish groups seem to have more competition
for resources. Both Iraqi Kurdish groups, the PKK and PJAK, have a clear leadership, which
suggests that there is no real competition for group leadership. Iraqi Kurds were divided into two
groups and these two groups were controlling certain areas of Northern Iraq where they held a
majority. However, the KDP and the PUK have long been competitive for resources.
Nevertheless, since 2005, they have overcome this problem and have agreed to share resources
and political power within the KRG. There are a few reasons for their decision. The first is that
the U.S. government encouraged both groups to cooperate during the Iraqi invasion to gain more
leverage against insurgencies within the Iraqi Government. Secondly, both groups realized that
the cost of not cooperating could diminish likelihood of the KRG’s survival. Clearly then, the
groups considered cooperation more beneficial than detrimental, leading them to cooperate. This
analysis suggests that competition for resources decreases group cooperation. However, once
groups decide how to share resources, cooperation becomes easy.
My hypothesis can also be implemented in the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (the LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Tamils in India. Tamils are another ethnic group that
lacks a homeland. They (both groups) live on different sides of the Palk Strait, allowing them to
travel across the sea much more easily (Palanithurai and Mohanasundaram 1993). Tamils in
India have more political and economical freedoms compared to Sri Lankan Tamils. Since 1983,
Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu secretly supported the struggle of the LTTE. They gave
moral support and provided them “facilities for training, arms, ammunition and communication
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equipments” (Other Report on Japan and Korea; Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry Condemns Tamil
Nadu Aid for Jaffna Tamils 1987). According to some sources, the LTTE has wide support from
Tamil Nadu politicians, judges, police, and influential Tamil Nadu newspapers (Burns 1995).
Obviously, ethnic ties represent vital hypotheses that explain group cooperation among Tamils.
Tamil Nadu has a great sympathy toward their co-ethnic group struggle in Sri-Lanka and
supports them through various means.
At first, the Indian government was silent regarding the activities of Tamils in Tamil
Nadu and was supportive of the LTTE to gain political support in Tamil Nadu. Nevertheless, the
Indian government withdrew its help to the LTTE when Indian military forces entered Sri Lanka
to urge peace between the two. Instead they fought against the LTTE and left after three years
(Burns 1995). Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India, also possessed an unfriendly attitude
toward militants Tamils in Tamil Nadu. He arrested 1,000 militants based in Tamil Nadu, taking
their weapons and telecommunication equipment as well (Shelia 1987). When Tamil militants
killed the former prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, in 1991, Indian Tamils felt less
compassionate toward the struggle of the LTTE (Indian lose sympathy for refugees, 1991). One
reason for their lack of compassion might be that after the assassination of Gandhi “police have
unearthed arms and explosives caches, closed illicit weapons factories, unraveled smuggling
rings and destroyed the Tiger's communications network in Tamil Nadu” (Chronology for Sri
Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka 2004). These incidents might have caused fear among the Tamils in
India to take side with the LTTE due to the consequences of being punished. The host state’s (in
this case India) attitude played a crucial role for Tamil Nadu’s support of the LTTE. First, they
were quiet, which suggests that they did not exercise any internal restraint of the activities. This
allowed Tamil Nadu to more readily and freely support LTTE activities. Nevertheless, later
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activities show that India has taken a different stance on the issue due to assassination of Gandhi.
This hinders the support of Tamils in Tamil Nadu to help the LTTE.
Since 1991, the Indian government has accepted the LTTE as a terrorist organization and
has used military force against the organization, not just because of the assassination of Rajiv
Gandhi, but also because they perceive the LTTE as a threat to increase the power and
momentum of secessionist sentiment in Tamil Nadu. For that reason, the Sri Lankan government
has resolved to find a political solution to the issue (India analyst criticizes southern leaders'
support for Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers 2008). In the mid-1990s, with the help of pro-LTTE parties
in the ruling coalition in India, the LTTE reestablished its network in Tamil Nadu. Even a top Sri
Lankan army official acknowledged that “the LTTE is able to ferry some of its injured cadres
to Tamil Nadu for treatment. There are also unconfirmed reports that some "outside" doctors
(presumably from Tamil Nadu) are working in the LTTE based hospitals in the Wanni”
(Balachanddran 1998). According to Pathmanathan, who holds position of the LTTE
plenipotentiary for international relations, “We are grateful that the people of Tamil Nadu have
expressed so much solidarity with Eelam Tamils. These are true feelings of the people without
any political or vested interests. It gives us solace to know that our brethren across the sea are
one with us in our time of grief and sorrow. The sentiments and emotions poured out by the
people of Tamil Nadu, and the cries of the Tamils in the island, are bound to reach the hearts of
the Government of India” (Negotiator says Tamil Tigers believe in "political solution" 2009).
This study reveals that the Indian political attitude was such that it allowed or overlooked the
activities of the LTTE. It is clear that the Indian government has sought to avoid upsetting Tamil
diaspora in its territory, which decreases the level of internal threat to Tamil citizens in India.
This allowed a greater level of cooperation between the groups. For its support to the LTTE,
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Tamils in India faced no external threat from either the Sri Lankan government or other
countries, which allowed for cooperation between the co-ethnic groups.
In conclusion, both examples confirm that ethnic ties are extremely important factors in
ethnic group cooperation. Nevertheless, ethnic group cooperation was greatly influenced by
external or internal threat or pressure. If groups receive a greater internal or external threat, it
decreases the level of cooperation. In this regard, if a host state supports an ethnic violent group,
then this will likely increase the level of cooperation among the same co-ethnic groups and
ethnic violent group residing in the host state, such as the Indian and Syrian Governments.
Moreover, great power(s) may influence groups’ cooperation positively or negatively, depending
upon states’ interest, as seen especially in the Kurdish case. Nevertheless, in the case of Tamils,
there is little if any involvement. However, further studies must be conducted in order to
extrapolate whether my hypothesis also explains non-cooperation among the same ethnic groups
in other cases.

81
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abdulla, Mufid. 2011. Civil War, Saddam’s demise and a vote for independence. The Kurdistan
Tribune.
Abdulrahman, Frman. 2012. What really happened to Iraqi Kurdish civil war missing in the
1990s: Never ending mystery. Kurds.Net
Ahmed, Mohammed M.A., Michael Gunter. 2007. The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism.
California: Mazda Publishers.
Al-Khoei, Hayder. 2009.Natural Alliance. Kurdish Herald. Vol. 1 Issue 2.
Al-Youm, Al-Masry. 2010. Turkey and Iraq’s Kurds: Loving thy Neighbor. The Kurdish
Regional Government Webpage.
Asker Alti Yil daha Kuzey Irak’ta. 2011. Ilke Haber.
Askin, Cevdet. 2011. Celik ve Karayilan’dan Bombalar. Radical.
Axelrod, Robert and Hammond A. Ross. 2003. The Evolution of Ethnocentric Behavior.
Midwest Political Science Convention. Chicago, IL
Barzani calls on PKK, PJAK to end attacks from Iraqi soil. 2011. Today’s Zaman.
Balanchanddran, P. K. 1998. LTTE Rebuilding Network in Tamil Nadu. Hindustan Times.
Bayram sonrasi: Sinirotesi mi Ateskes mi? 2011. Radical.
Berberoglu, Berch. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Burns, F. John. The Rebels In Sri Lanka Find Allies In India. 1995. The New York Times.
British parliamentarians voice concern about Iranian and Turkish bombardment of Kurdistan
border. 2011.krg.org.
Brandon, James. 2006. Iran’s Kurdish Threat: PJAK. TerrorismMonitor. Vol. IV, Issue 12, pp. 111.
Bruinessen, van Martin. 1986. Hidden Wars. MERIP Middle East Report. No.141. pp. 14-27
Bhadrakumar, M. K. 2007. Turkey’s Kurdish Worries Deepen. AsianTimes.
Cavdar, Cengiz. 2011. Kandil Stop on Tehran-Damascus Road. Daily News.
Cemal, Hasan. 2012. Zamanin Ruhu ve Dis Konjonkur PKK’ya karsi! Milliyet Gazetesi.

82
Charountaki, Marianna. 2011. The Kurds and U.S. Foreign Policy. Routledge: New York.
Chronology for Sri Lanka Tamils in Sri Lanka. 2004. Minority at Risk Project.
Davis, R. David and Will H. Moore. 1997. Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and
Foreign Policy Behavior. International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 171-184.
Doyle, W. Micheal (1997), War and Peace. New York: W. W. Norton&Company.
Edmonds, C. J. 1971. Nationalism and Separatism: Kurdish Nationalism. Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 87-107.
Eligür, Banu. 2006. Turkish-American Relations Since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled
Partnership. Middle East Brief. No.6, pp. 1-8.
Entessar, Nader. 1992. Kurdish Politics in the Middle East. Maryland: The Rowman &
Littlefield Publishing Group.
Ertan, Ozlem. 2012. Barzani, PKK Soylemini Sertlestirdi. Taraf gazetesi.
Federal Research Division. 1995. Turkey: A Country Study.
FM for Further KRG Trade. 2011.Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries & Mines.
Fielding-Smith, Abigail. 2010. Turkey finds a gateway to Iraq. The Financial Times.
Freedom House. 2002. Freedom in the World - Kurdistan [Iraq] (2002).
Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Gary Segura+ 1998+ War, Casualties, and Public Opinion. Journal
of Conflict Resolution. Vol.42, No. 3, pp.78–30.
Geddes, Barbara. 2003. Paradigms and Sand Castles. Michigan. The University of Michigan
Press.
Gillis, LTC Patrick F. 2004. U.S. – Turkish Relations: The Road to Improving a Troubled
Strategic Partnership. Strategy Research Project. pp. 1- 27.
Governorate Assessment Report Erbil Governorate. 2007. UNHCR. pp.1-36.
Gunter, M. Michael. 1998. Turkey and Iran face off in Kurdistan. Middle East Quarterly. Vol. V,
No. 1 pp. 33-40
Gunter, M. Michael. 2000. The Continuing Kurdish Problem in Turkey after Öcalan's Capture.
Third World Quarterly. Vol. 21, pp. 849-869.
Gunter, M. Michael. 2003. The A to Z of the Kurds. Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield
Publishing Group.

83
Hassanpour, Amir. 1994. The Kurdish Experience. Middle East Report, No. 189, pp. 2-7+23.
Hedefi Türk-Kürt Kardeşliği. 2011. Radical Gazetesi.
Hechter, Michael, Friedman, Debra, and Appelbaum, Malka. 1982. A Theory of Ethnic
Collective Action. International Migration Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.412-434.
Herbst, Jeffrey. 1989. The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa.
International Organization 43 (4):673-92.
Hooper, Simon. 2007. PKK's decades of violent struggle. CNN World
Horowitz, L. Donald. 1981. Patterns of Ethnic Separatism. Comparative Studies in Society and
History. Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 165-195.
India analyst criticizes southern leaders' support for Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers. 2008. BBC
Monitoring South Asia.
Indians lose sympathy for refugees. 1991. The Guardian.
Iranian Kurdistan. 2008. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO).
Iran/ Turkey: Recent Attacks on Civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan. 2011. Human Rights Watch.
Iraqi Kurdistan Cross Border Attacks should Spare Iraqi Civilians. 2011. Human Rights Watch.
Iraqi Kurdistan Deploys 12,000 Kurdish Troops Along the Iran Border. 2011. ekurd.net.
Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani Warns Iran over shelling. 2011. ekurd.net.
Iraqi Kurds accuse Iran of illegal border crossing, 10,000 revolutionary guards cross the Iraqi
border: Al-Rafedain TV. 2011. ekurd.net.
Iraq says Iran Shelling of Kurdish PJAK Rebels Damage Ties. 2011. ekurd.net.
Jenne, K. Erin. 2007. Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Kalin, Ibrahim. 2007. Kurdish crisis offers a chance for lasting peace. SETA.
Kalkan, Sarp. 2011. The Transformative Power of the Turkish Private Sector in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Tepav.
Katzman, Kenneth. 2009. The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq. Congressional Research Service
Report for Congress.
Kaya, S. Mehmed. 2011. The Zaza Kurds of Turkey. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

84
Kemal, Lale. 2011. Kuzey Irak’a Kapsamli Gireriz. Taraf Gazetesi.
King, Charles and Neil J. Melvin. 1999-2000. Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign
Policy, and Security in Eurasia. International Security. Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 108-138.
Kirisci, Kemal and Gareth M. Winrow. 1997. The Kurdish Question and Turkey. Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd:London.
KRG Statement on first High-level Talks with Turkey. 2008. The Kurdish Regional Government
Webpage.
KRG welcomes talks with Turkey. 2008. The Kurdish Regional Government Webpage.
Kurdistan Region Presidency Strongly Condemns Violent Attack in Turkey. 2011. The Kurdish
Regional Government Webpage.
Larson, W. Deborah. 1997. Trust and missed opportunities in international relations. Political
Psychology. Vol.18, 701-734.
Manzano, Sylvia and Gabriel R. Sanchez. 2010. Take One for the Team? Limits of Shared
Ethnicity and Candidate Preferences. Political Research Quarterly. 63 (3), pp. 568-580.
Marcus, Aliza. 2007. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. New
York: New York University Press.
McKiernan, Kevin. 2006. The Kurds. St. Martin’s Press: New York.
Miller, Ross A. 1995. Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force. American Journal
of Political Science 39 (3):760-85.
Minorities at Risk Project. 2010. Chronology for Kurd in Iraq.
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. Domestic Discontent and the External Use of
Force. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1):25-52.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1967. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 4th ed.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Natali, Denise. 2010. The Kurdish Quasi-state. NewYork. Syracuse University Press.
Olson, Robert. 2005. The Goat and the Butcher. California. Mazda Publishers, Inc.
Olson, Robert. 1992. The Kurdish question in the aftermath of the Gulf War: geopolitical and
geostrategic changes in the Middle East. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 475-499.

85
O’Leary, A. Carole. 2002. The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future prospects. Meria Journal.
Vol. 6, No. 4.
Other Report on Japan and Korea; Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry Condemns Tamil Nadu Aid for
Jaffna Tamils. 1987. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
Ozoğlu, Hakan. 2001. "Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman–Early
Republican Era. International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 383-409.
Pacal, Omer. 2012. Suriye’de Durum ve PYD’nin Pozisyonu. Bianet.org.
Palanithurai, G., Mohanasundaran K. 1993. Dynamics of Tamil Nadu Politics in Sri Lankan
Ethnicity. New Delhi: Northern Book Center.
Park, Bill. 2003. Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States, and
Northern Iraq. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2, 11-23.
Prime Minister Barzani Commends Turkey's Troop Withdrawal. 2008. The Kurdish Regional
Government Webpage.
President Barzani, Turkey's Foreign Minister Davutoğlu Hold Historic Meetings, Announce
Plans to Open Consulate. 2009. The Kurdish Regional Government Webpage.
President Barzani praises Turkey's Effort s to engage with Kurds. 2009. The Kurdish Regional
Government Webpage.
President Barzani Wraps up Historic Trip to Turkey. 2010. The Kurdish Regional Government
Webpage.
President Barzani and Prime Minister Erdogan open Erbil International Airport and Turkish
Consulate. 2011. The Kurdish Regional Government Webpage.
President Barzani meets Supreme Leader Khamanei and President Ahmadinejad in Tehran.
2011. krg.org.
Prime Minister Barzani welcomes Extension of PKK Ceasefire. 2009. The Kurdish Regional
Government Webpage.
Prime Minister Salih meets Iran's President in official visit to Tehran. 2011. krg.org.
Prunier, Gérard. 2004. Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo
(1986-99). African Affairs. No.103 (412), pp.359–83.
Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and David E. Cunningham. 2011. Explaining
Transnational Support for Insurgent Groups. International Organizations. 65, PP.709-744.

86
Stainsfield, R. V. Gareth. 2003. Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent
Democracy. New York. Routledge Curzon.
Statement: KRG Strongly Condemns Bombardment of Border Areas by Islamic Republic of
Iran. 2009. krg.org.
Shaoul, Jean. 2011. Turkey’s assault on Kurds in Iraq Presages Regional Conflicts. World
Socialist Web Site.
Saideman, M. Stephen. 1997. Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist Conflicts:
Vulnerability versus EthnicTies. International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 721-753.
Semin, Ali. 2012. KDP-PUK Relations: Regional Developments and Changes. IRST Anatolia
Daily.
Sheffer, Gabriel. 1986. 'A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Polities'
Modern Diasporas in World Politics. London: Croom Helm. pp. 1-15.
Shifrinso, R. Itzkowitz Joshua. 2006. The Kurds and Regional Security: An Evaluation of
Developments since the Iraq War. Middle East Brief. No.14, pp. 1-9
Silah Birakmasi icin PKK’yi ikna ettik. 2011. Radical.
Sorrentino, J. Rachel. 2003. Ethnic Nationalist Actors:Prospects for Cooperation Between Ethnic
Nationalist Homeland States and Diaspora. Dissertation.The Ohio State University.
Spencer, Phillip and Howard Wollman. 2005. Nations and Nationalism. New Jersey: Rutgers
University Press.
Soto, DeFrancesco and Victoria Maria. 2007. Do Latinos party all the time? The role of shared
ethnic group identity on political choice. Disertation. Vol. 68, Issue 2, pp. 1-708.
Steward, Michael. 2003. A New European Form of Transnational Politics. Diaspora. 12:1, pp.
67-101.
Sinclair, Christian and Sirwan Kajjo. 2011. The Evolution of Kurdish Politics in Syria. MERIP.
The Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). 2000-2012. GlobalSecurity.org.
Tir, Jaroslav. 2005. Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts between Rump and
Secessionist States. The Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 713-741.
Tefft, Sheila. 1987. Sri Lanka conflict takes new twist. Christian Science Monitor.
Timmerman, R. Kenneth. 2007. High Stakes Game in Northern Iraq. FrontPageMagazine.com

87
Tol, Gonul. 2012. Analysis | Turkey and Iran Find Common Ground in Iraq. Frontline.
Turkey and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict or Cooperations? 2008. Middle East Report, No. 81, pp. 1-33.
Turkey’s Foreign Trade Minister participates in Erbil Economic Forum. 2010. The Kurdish
Regional Government Webpage.
Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary meets President Barzani and PM Salih. 2011. The
Kurdish Regional Government Webpage.
Turkey’s Interior Minister discusses security with President and Prime Minister in Erbil. 2010.
The Kurdish Regional Government Webpage.
UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi AsylumSeekers. 2009. UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency. pp. 1-250.
UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data Program). Definitions. www.ucdp.uu.se
U.S. Department of State. 2011. Background Information. U.S. –Turkey Relation s.
www.state.gov.
Von Mende, Leyla. Who's Afraid of Kurdistan? Turkey's Policy on Iraq between Military
Intervention and Efforts towards Dialogue. 2008. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft. Issue
4, pp. 18-32.
Wayland, Sarah. 2004. Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri
Lankan Tamil Diaspora. Review of International Studies. Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 405-426.
Wilgenburg, van Wladimir. 2009. Kurdish Iranian party KDPI: “We are not rejecting the armed
struggle”. Kurd.net
Yavuz, M. Hakan. 2001. Five Stages of the Construction of the Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey.
Nationalism &Ethnic Politics. Vol.7, pp.1-24.
Yavuz M. Hakan and Michael M. Gunter. 2001. The Kurdish Nation. Middle East. Vol. 100, pp.
33-39.
Yetkin, Murat. 2012. The Kurdish Problem: Developments to Watch. Daily News.
Yirmi Altinci Operasyon. 2011. Taraf Gazetesi.

